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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past thirty years the judiciary has developed two related 
misconceptions about the “technology-based” standards adopted by 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA” or “the 
Agency”) that generally require all members of an industry to limit 
their releases of harmful pollutants by using particular pollution con-
trol technologies.  First, some courts mistakenly believe that to set 
those standards EPA merely conducts a technocratic evaluation of 
the control technologies available to a given industry without making 
a policy-laden choice of whether the benefits offered by any candi-
date technology justify the  costs to operate it.2  Second, some judges 
incorrectly assume that EPA selects technology-based standards 
 
 2. See infra  text accompanying notes 84-101 (discussing EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone 
Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980), Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975), and Tex. 
Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998)).  Scholars also have described technol-
ogy-based standards, which EPA supposedly sets by simply determining which control method 
is “feasible,” as distinct from standards that EPA sets by weighing both the costs and the bene-
fits of regulation.  See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE 
LAW 69, 81-93 (1989) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER] (drawing distinc-
tion between “feasibility” analysis and “cost-benefit analysis”); Thomas O. McGarity, Media -
Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regu-
lation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 160 (1983) [hereinafter Environmental Strategies] (con-
trasting a technology-based regulatory approach with a “balancing” approach that considers 
costs and benefits).  As discussed below, while a formal, monetized comparison of costs and 
benefits is not required in setting a technology-based standard, the question of whether a tech-
nology is “feasible” or “available” hinges on whether its costs are worth its benefits in some 
vague sense. 
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without taking into account the public health and environmental risks 
posed by the industrial facilities to be regulated.3 
These misconceptions have led to seriously adverse conse-
quences.  EPA has been allowed to frustrate the goals of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by shielding key aspects of its stan-
dard setting process from the judicial and public scrutiny so vital to 
maintaining the Agency’s accountability.4  EPA has successfully con-
vinced courts not to give appropriate APA review to the Agency’s 
calculations of a control technology’s public health and environ-
mental benefits, even though they were plainly evident in, and inher-
ently necessary to, its rulemakings.5  In addition, EPA has managed to 
hide from the citizenry its estimates of one factor—the toxicities of 
the pollutants at issue—that substantially affects the assessment of 
those public health and environmental benefits.6 
 
 3. See infra  text accompanying notes 173-85 (discussing Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. 
EPA, 255 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 2001) and Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).  
EPA’s own statements suggest it does not take risk into account when setting technology-based 
standards.  See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source 
Categories and for Coke Oven Batteries, 58 Fed. Reg. 57,898, 57,907 (Oct. 27, 1993) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63) (“[e]stimates of risk to the surrounding community simply do not 
play a role in the development of [technology-based standards]”); National Emission Standards 
for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Generic Maximum Achievable Control Technology (Generic 
MACT), 64 Fed. Reg. 34,854, 34,860 (June 29, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (“we do 
not consider health risks” when setting those standards). 
Perhaps mirroring EPA’s language, scholars similarly have described technology-based 
standards as not set “on the basis of health risks” and not taking into account “the magnitude of 
the health risks posed by the pollutant.”  Joseph M. Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air 
Quality Standards, 24 ENVTL. L. 821, 876-77 (1994).  See also Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph 
of Technology-Based Standards, 2000  U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 106 [hereinafter Triumph] (describing 
technology-based standards as “environment-blind”).  These claims by jurists, scholars, and 
even EPA are accurate, as discussed below, to the extent they suggest EPA does not make full, 
detailed, and precise assessments of the risks posed by a regulated entity, but overstate the case 
if they suggest public health and environmental risks are entirely irrelevant to the process of 
setting technology-based standards.  See infra text accompanying notes 169-72. 
 4. See infra  text accompanying notes 77-82 (discussing 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c), 706(2) 
(2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 307(b), (d) (2000)). 
 5. See infra  text accompanying notes 84-106. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 140-64.  The industrial chemicals and other toxic 
substances released into the environment by vast numbers of manufacturers, agricultural opera-
tions, and other enterprises can cause a wide variety of adverse health effects to humans and to 
flora and fauna.  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 9-10 (1983) (describing the increase, beginning in the 
late 1960s, of scientific evidence demonstrating that “suspect” chemicals may be causing cancer 
or other chronic health effects); David L. Eaton, Scientific Judgment and Toxic Torts—A Primer 
in Toxicology for Judges and Lawyers, 12 J.L & POL’Y 5, 5-6, 22-29 (2003) (discussing environ-
mental factors, including exposure to chemical agents, as causes of disease); James Gustave 
Speth, EPA Must Help Lead an Environmental Revolution in Technology, 21 ENVTL. L. 1425, 
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This article will examine these issues in the context of two par-
ticular types of technology-based standards: the Clean Water Act’s 
“BAT” standards, which require the members of regulated industries 
to restrict their discharges of water pollutants to levels reflecting the 
“best available technologies,”7 and the Clean Air Act’s “MACT” 
standards, which similarly limit emissions of air pollutants using the 
“maximum achievable control technologies.”8  Based on a careful ex-
amination of more than 100 regulations, this artic le will document 
that EPA’s methods of selecting BAT and MACT standards contra-
dict the common—but inaccurate—judicial assumptions.9 
This article will also demonstrate that the judiciary’s misunder-
standings stem ultimately from the ambiguous statutory provisions 
and legislative histories of the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air 
Act, which erroneously imply that technology-based standards are set 
without regard to the public health and environmental benefits that 
may flow from pollution control technologies.  Some aspects of the 
Clean Water Act, for example, seem to indicate that EPA need not 
balance a control technology’s benefits against its costs when the 
Agency selects BAT standards.  Yet the overall structure of the Clean 
Water Act, together with certain congressional statements, makes it 
 
1427-31 (1991) (recounting the “huge quantities” of pollutants released by various industrial 
sectors since World War II and the adverse health effects of same).  Assessing the toxicity of a 
pollutant involves both a qualitative inquiry about “the types of adverse health effects associ-
ated with exposure to a chemical” and a quantitative inquiry about the “magnitude of these ad-
verse health effects resulting from specific exposures to the chemical.”  TOXIC AIR POLLUTION 
HANDBOOK 57 (David R. Patrick ed., 1994). 
 7. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2000) (also known as section 304(b)(2)(A)-(B) of the 
Clean Water Act).  For ease, this article will refer to regulated “industries” when in actuality a 
wide variety of entities are governed by the technology-based standards under the Clean Water 
Act and the Clean Air Act, from traditional industries and manufacturers to various commercial 
enterprises, municipalities, hospitals, and educational facilities.  See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 411.10-
411.37 (2004) (standards for cement manufacturers); id. §§ 405.10-405.127 (dairy products proc-
essors); id. §§ 435.10-435.70 (oil and gas extraction); id. §§ 460.10-460.12 (hospitals); id. §§ 
63.1930-63.1980 (municipal solid waste landfills); id. § 63.7575 (boilers at “research centers, in-
stitutions of higher education, hotels, and laundries”). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2)-(3) (2000) (also known as section 112(d)(2)-(3) of the  Clean Air 
Act).  The Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act are often analyzed together since they share 
many common features and were adopted at roughly the same time in the early 1970s, when 
Congress first adopted several different statutes addressing environmental issues.  See, e.g., 
Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 206-09 (1999) (analogizing between Clean Air Act and Clean Wa-
ter Act for airshed and watershed approache s to regulation); Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen 
Pollution on Long Island Sound:  Is There a Place for Pollutant Trading? , 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 137, 153-82 (1998) (comparing the two Acts’ provisions with respect to pollutant trading). 
 9. See infra  text accompanying notes 65-75 and 123-65. 
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clear that such a balancing is compelled by Congress’ goals.10  Like-
wise, certain elements of the Clean Air Act incorrectly suggest a fun-
damental dichotomy between technology-based standards, on the one 
hand, and “health-based” standards, on the other, with only the latter 
supposedly requiring an evaluation of the public health and environ-
mental risks from the pollutants and facilities under review.  The dif-
ference, however, between those two types of restrictions is not 
whether EPA considers those risks but how it does so.  When setting a 
technology-based standard, the Agency is expected to—and does—
use far simpler measures of the risks and corresponding public health 
benefits of regulation than if it were implementing a health-based 
standard.11 
Because the judicial misconceptions that allow the Agency to 
thwart the APA arise from the confusing statutory schemes, legisla-
tive changes are needed to correct those misconceptions and to en-
sure the transparency of EPA’s future rulemakings.  The Clean Water 
Act’s BAT provision and the Clean Air Act’s MACT provision 
should be amended to expressly require EPA, when setting standards, 
not only to weigh the costs of operating pollution control technologies 
(which the statutes already require) but also the benefits of improved 
public health and environmental quality offered by those technolo-
gies.12  While these statutory amendments might be controversial be-
cause they reject the prevalent—though mistaken—notions of BAT 
and MACT standards, the changes are necessary to ensure that in all 
its rulemakings EPA reveals to the citizenry and judiciary the public 
health and environmental risks posed by the regulated industries and 
the corresponding benefits of pollution controls, which the Agency 
must logically consider and does, in fact, consider. 
 
 10. See infra  text accompanying notes 50-64. 
 11. See infra  text accompanying notes 167-85. 
 12. See infra  text accompanying notes 195-208 (explaining how EPA could use simple 
methods of measuring those public health and environmental benefits).  The observations and 
suggestions made here about these two specific programs would also apply to any future use of 
technology-based standards in other arenas.  Professor Wagner, for instance, has written that 
such standards would be valuable under:  
the Clean Air Act [for regulating] the seven criteria pollutants emitted by many exist-
ing sources, the Toxic Substances Control Act for pre-market testing requirements, the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act for setting worker protection standards, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act for stan-
dardized cleanup requirements . . . specifying limitations on private party interference 
with endangered species and providing a more predictable and constructive approach 
to conserving wetlands. 
Triumph, supra note 3, at 109-10. 
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II.  THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S TECHNOLOGY-BASED STANDARDS 
A. Legislative History: Rejection of Health-Based Programs as the 
Primary Regulatory Tool 
The technology-based standards of the Clean Water Act orig i-
nated in 1972 as a response to the failed implementation of an earlier 
health-based regulatory program that required states to adopt, with 
EPA oversight, “water quality standards”13 for all interstate waters to 
“protect the public health or welfare [and] enhanc e the quality of wa-
ter.”14  The water quality standards were intended to establish, inter 
alia, the maximum level of pollution that would be safe for individuals 
who drank from a waterway, fished in it, or boated on it,15 but few 
 
 13. At that time, a water quality standard consisted of three elements: (1) a “designated 
use” for a particular water body (such as fishing, agriculture, or the like); (2) a “water quality 
criterion,” which identifies the level of contamination that can be permitted in that water body 
while still supporting the designated use; and (3) a “plan of enforcement.”  WILLIAM H. 
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 242-44 (2d ed. 1986) (describing wa-
ter quality criteria and designated uses).  See also Miss. Comm’n on Natural Res. v. Costle, 625 
F.2d 1269, 1272 (5th Cir. 1980) (giving examples of “[p]ossible uses” of waterways “for industry, 
agriculture, propagation and protection of fish and wildlife, recreation, and public water sup-
ply”).  Congress subsequently dropped the requirement for an enforcement plan as part of the 
standard itself, so today water quality standards include just two elements: the designated uses 
of waterways and the water quality criteria.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000); Rodgers, su-
pra, at 242-43.  In a separate provision, the legislature established a key mechanism—total 
maximum daily loads (“TMDLs”)—for implementing  the water quality standards.  33 U.S.C. § 
1313(d)(1)(C). 
 14. That statutory mandate stemmed from the Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(3) (1964 ed., Supp. V), amended by Pub. 
L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)).  For Congress’ rejection of that approach beginning in 
1972, see FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972: SENATE 
PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 2770, S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 4 (1971), 
as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3671 (explaining how earlier program required states to 
“establish the maximum level of pollution allowable in interstate waters” and discussing difficul-
ties of that earlier program).  The history of, and difficulties with, the states’ efforts to imple-
ment the water quality standards have been written about extensively, so only a brief summary 
will be given here.  See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1042 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(describing history and citing various earlier law review articles regarding same); William L. 
Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, Local, and Fed-
eral Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 189-200 (2003) [hereinafter Andreen 
Part I] (discussing reasons for frustrations with state efforts); William L. Andreen, The Evolu-
tion of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-
1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 260-86 (2003) [hereinafter Andreen Part II] (discussing 
federal response, in 1972, to failures of state programs); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of 
State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1180-85 
(1983) (discussing same); William F. Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 69, 75-80 (1988) (discussing same).  
 15. See Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (codified at 33 
U.S.C. § 466g(c)(3) (1964 ed., Supp. V)),  amended by Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) 
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states adopted the standards because they lacked both the political 
will and the resources to do so.16  Moreover, the pre-1972 law did not 
authorize the state or federal governments to set specific discharge 
limits on individual industrial plants, commercial establishments, or 
municipal wastewater plants to prevent the degradation of a water 
body.17  Instead, regulators could only enforce the standards against 
an individual discharger after showing that it, in fact, was causing a 
violation of a water quality standard, which involved such a cumber-
some process that very few enforcement actions were brought by the 
state or federal regulatory agencies.18 
As a result, Congress began shifting the primary means of regu-
lating water pollution from this health-based approach to technology-
 
(requiring standards that, inter alia , “protect the public health or welfare” and “enhance the 
quality of water . . . tak[ing] into consideration [the water’s] use and value for public water sup-
plies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and 
other legitimate uses.”).  See also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 
511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994) (describing, under the modern Clean Water Act, protections for waters 
used for “drinking water, recreation, navigation or . . . as a fishery”).  
 16. See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 4 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3671 (ex-
plaining that many states did not have standards even after five years); Andreen Part I, supra 
note 14, at 194 (recounting weak enforcement efforts by states, in part, because of  “limited po-
litical power”); Khristine L. Hall, The Control of Toxic Pollutants Under the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IOWA L. REV. 609, 611-12 (1978) (“Establishing an 
effective water quality standard was a cumbersome process, and many states resisted imple-
menting effective standards.”). 
 17. See P.D. Reed, Industry Effluent Limitations Program in Disarray as Congress Prepares 
for Debate on Water Act Amendments, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,033, 10,033 n.2 (1982) (The pre -
1972 law “did not specify how any agency was to translate water quality data into enforceable 
effluent standards for the diverse facilities discharging into polluted waterways.”); Andreen Part 
II, supra note 14, at 254 n.249 (noting that pre-1972 law did not include “a statutory provision 
calling for the establishment of effluent limitations” on individual dischargers).  Some states did, 
in fact, try to adopt permitting schemes to establish discharge limits for polluting facilities; other 
states declined to do so.  See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 
200, 203 (1976); Andreen Part I, supra note 14, at 196. 
 18. The 1972 Senate Report noted “an almost total lack of enforcement” of the water qua l-
ity standards.  S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 5 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672.  It 
also referred to the “great difficulty associated with establishing reliable and enforceable precise 
effluent limitations on the basis of a given stream quality,” and observed that the standards “of-
ten cannot be translated into effluent limitations—defendable in court tests [—] . . . because of 
the imprecision of models for water quality and the effects of effluents in most waters.”  Id. at 
3675.  See also Gaba, supra  note 14, at 1179 (few enforcement actions were brought because the 
“1965 Act still required the government to locate a source of pollution and to prove that the 
particular source had caused the violation of a water quality standard”); State Water Res. Con-
trol Bd., 426 U.S. at 202 (referring to “cumbrous enforcement procedures” under the pre-1972 
law); Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1044 n.50 (describing legislators’ frustration with $2 million 
spent on trying to prove that the discharge of one particular industry would adversely affect the 
quality of its receiving water and the oysters in that water). 
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based programs.19  The 1972 Amendments to the Clean Water Act20 
directed EPA to set technology-based limits for pollutant discharges 
from existing industrial “point sources.”21  Those standards, which 
generally would apply uniformly to all members of an industry across 
the nation,22 depended on the Agency’s study of the industry to de-
termine which pollutants it released and which control options, if any, 
were available to reduce or eliminate those pollutants.23  The stan-
 
 19. See Reed, supra  note 17, at 10,033 (In 1972, Congress “scrap[ped] an ineffective regula-
tory system based on water quality in favor of a more workable technology-based system of ef-
fluent regulation.”); Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of 
Environmental Law , 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 418 (1994) (“[B]est available technology side -stepped the 
age-old and irresolvable arguments of whether ‘significant’ harm existed and who was ‘causing’ 
it and began to abate the pollution itself.”); State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 204-05 (Af-
ter the 1972 statutory amendments, a “discharger’s performance [was] . . . measured against 
strict technology-based effluent limitations—specif[ing] levels of treatment—to which it must 
conform, rather than against limitations derived from water quality standards to which it and 
other polluters must colle ctively conform.”). 
 20. Officially the 1972 amendments were called the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1251-1387 (2000)). 
 21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b).  See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 
112, 128 (1977) (interpreting 1972 amendments to authorize EPA to adopt binding, industry -
wide technology-based regulations). 
“Point sources” are pipes, channels, or other discrete, identifiable means to convey pollut-
ants into receiving water bodies.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).  Any point source discharging a pollut-
ant into waters of the United States is required to obtain a permit under the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), which requires compliance, at a minimum, with the 
technology-based standards set by EPA.  Id. § 1342.  See Hall, supra note 16, at 612. 
Since 1972, EPA has also been required to set technology-based standards for brand new 
industrial sources, known as “New Source Performance Standards.”  See 33 U.S.C. § 1316.  
Sources of municipal wastewater, as opposed to industrial dischargers, are regulated under a 
separate program.  Id. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (requiring publicly owned treatment works to use “se c-
ondary treatment” by 1977); id. § 1311(b)(2)(B) (1970 ed., Supp. III) (requiring, by 1983, the use 
of the best practicable waste treatment technology), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-117, § 21(b), 95 
Stat. 1623, 1632 (1981)). 
 22. See Hall, supra note 16, at 612 (describing the “nationally uniform” standards).  Under 
limited circumstances, an individual member of a regulated industrial category can be excused 
from a technology-based standard under a “variance.”  See William Funk, The Exception that 
Approves the Rule: FDF Variances Under the Clean Water Act, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 
1-47 (1985) (analyzing three United States Supreme Court decisions that addressed the scope of 
variances under the Clean Water Act). 
 23. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection 
Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 810-11 (1977).  EPA’s task of identifying the pollution control 
technologies that are “available” to an industry actually leaves the Agency with considerable 
discretion because it must determine, for instance, whether a control method used only on an 
experimental, pilot project is “available” for the industry as a whole.  Compare Tanners’ Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1195 (4th Cir. 1976) (EPA may sets standards based on “tech-
nologies that have not been applied” yet) with Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1038 
(10th Cir. 1976) (EPA’s reliance on data from one pilot plant not sufficient basis for standards).  
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dards were to apply in two stages:  By 1977 all existing industrial 
sources of “non-toxic” pollutants24 would have to meet discharge lim-
its reflecting the “best practicable control technology currently avail-
able,” called “BPT” standards,25 and by 1983 all such sources would 
have to meet more stringent limits based on the “best available tech-
nology economically achievable,” called “BAT” standards.26  Further 
modifications were enacted in 1977 when the legislature divided the 
non-toxic pollutants into two subsets and established for the so called 
 
Moreover, the Agency must decide whether a well-established but extraordinarily expensive 
technology is “available.”  As Professors Ackerman and Stewart wrote: 
“Available technology” is an elastic concept.  In many instances, including most cases 
of water pollution, technology is available in an engineering sense to eliminate pollu-
tion entirely.  If we were willing to spend hundreds of billions of dollars, we could have 
drinking water flowing from industrial waste discharge pipes (although disposing of the 
pollutants removed from waste streams could present serious problems).  Accordingly, 
most decisions about “available” technology must —implicitly or explicitly —take costs 
into account. 
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environment Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
1333, 1359 n.60 (1985). 
 24. Examples of so called non-toxic pollutants (a poor choice of words for substances that 
can cause adverse health and environmental effects) include suspended solids, oil, grease, fecal 
coliform, ammonia, formaldehyde, and phosphorous.  See, e.g., Effluent Limitations Guide lines 
and New Source Perfomance Standards for the Concentrated Aquatic Animal Production Point 
Source Category, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,872, 57,874 (proposed Sept. 12, 2002) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 451) (listing pollutants in the “conventional” and “non-conventional” subcategories 
of “non-toxic” pollutants). 
 25. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A).  While early case law used the more technically correct 
acronym of “BPCTCA” (see, e.g., Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1978), 
this art icle will use the more common “BPT” acronym. 
 26. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A).  See du Pont, 430 U.S. at 121 (setting forth the 1977 and 
1983 deadlines for the respective technology-based standards).  While early case law used the 
more technically correct acronym of “BATEA” (see, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1016), this 
article will use the more common “BAT” acronym. 
Congress retained water quality standards as a supplement to the technology-based pro-
gram.  See Miss. Comm’n on Natural Res. v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1272 (5th Cir. 1980) (describ-
ing legislative history in 1972 with regard to water quality standards).  States were required to 
continue designating uses for water bodies and to adopt water quality criteria to meet those 
uses, with EPA oversight.  Id.  If an industrial discharger meeting technology-based standards 
contributed to the degradation of a particular waterway, its permit limits would have to be 
ratcheted down to help meet the water quality standards.  See EPA v. California ex rel. State 
Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976). 
This article will refer to a pollution control “technology” to mean not only a post-
production, add-on device that removes pollutants from an air stack or water outfall pipe, but 
also to work practices that minimize the creation of pollutants before they ever reach the stack 
or pipe.  This article will also refer to the “best” technology in quotations because there is no 
single, absolute “best” method for any given industry; instead, as discussed below, what EPA 
calls the “best” technology is a policy judgment about which reasonable persons could disagree.  
See infra  text accompanying notes 65-76. 
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“conventional, non-toxic” pollutants27 the new “BCT” standards, re-
ferring to the “best conventional” technology,28 while for the “non-
conventional but non-toxic” pollutants29 the compliance deadlines for 
the BAT standards were extended.30 
For “toxic pollutants,” which include carcinogens,31 Congress was 
unwilling in 1972 to abandon the health-based regulatory program, 
but it did put the onus on EPA rather than the states to implement 
the scheme.32  The legislature mandated that the Agency set standards 
that would provide an “ample margin of safety” to protect public 
health,33 which, like water quality standards, required the regulators 
to try to make a detailed inquiry into the risks posed by a pollutant in 
a water body to declare a “safe” level.34  That inquiry proved far too 
complex to be implemented in a timely fashion,35 and after five years 
 
 27. See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive 
Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity , 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 48 n.100 (2003) (“Conventional 
pollutants include biological oxygen demand, suspended solids, fecal coliform, and pH.”). 
 28. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(E), 1314(b)(4).  See Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 
156, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (The 1977 amendments “replac[ed] BAT altogether for ‘conventional’ 
non-toxic pollutants with the weaker requirement of ‘best conventional pollutant control tech-
nology.’”). 
 29. Non-conventional but non-toxic pollutants include ammonia, formaldehyde, and phos-
phorous.  See, e.g., Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for 
the Concentrated Aquatic Animal Production Point Source Category, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,872, 
57,874 (proposed Sept. 12, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 451) (listing pollutants in that 
category). 
 30. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 56, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (amended 1987) (deadlines ranging from 
1984 to 1987).  
 31. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (defining pollutants as “toxic” if they will “cause death, disease, 
behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions . . . or physical 
deformations . . .”). 
 32. Hall, supra  note 16, at 613 (explaining how Congress “singled out” toxic pollutant in 
1972 for regulation by EPA under an “ample margin of safety” standard).  
 33. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(4). 
 34. Reed, supra note 17, at 10,037 (standards for toxic water pollutants were to be based on 
“the toxicity, persistence, and degradability of the pollutants”); Howard Latin, Ideal v. Real 
Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Re-
forms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1308 (1985) (standards for toxic water pollutants required EPA 
“to identify safe exposure levels”). 
 35. As Howard Latin writes:  
Thomas Jorling, the Assistant Administrator for Water and Hazardous Materials, test i-
fied before Congress that section 307(a) [33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)] was “technically imprac-
tical” because of the requirement “to demonstrate the cause and effect relationship be-
tween pollutants and public health.”  A 1977 legislative report on toxic pollutant 
regulation observed:  “Without exception, witnesses testified to the overall lack of data 
for setting standards for either water quality or for individual chemicals, and to there 
being less data available than estimated at the time the FWPCA was enacted.”  Wit-
nesses also agreed that reliable harm-based determinations were difficult to make and 
that the EPA possessed insufficient resources to identify safe exposure levels for most 
toxic substances. 
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EPA had only proposed “ample margin of safety” standards for nine 
toxic water pollutants, and had finalized none.36  Consequently, with 
the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Water Act, Congress required 
EPA to establish technology-based BAT standards for existing 
sources of toxic pollutants as well.37 
Hence, by that year, for both toxic and non-toxic water pollut-
ants, Congress had abandoned its health-based regulatory system that 
had attempted, but failed, to calculate the precise risks to public 
health and the environment posed by industrial sources and to restrict 
discharges of water pollutants to “safe” levels.  Instead, the legislature 
required each regulated source to meet technology-based discharge 
limits that reflected EPA’s selection of the “best” pollution control 
technology available for that source, given the types of pollutants it 
released. 
B. The Necessary Weighing of Costs and Risk Reduction Benefits to 
Determine the “Best” Technology 
1. Background: The “Best Practicable Technology” Standards 
and the “Best Conventional Technology” Standards 
EPA’s implementation of the technology-based programs can 
best be understood by first examining the statutory provisions for the 
two, less stringent types of technology-based standards under the 
Clean Water Act: the “best practicable technology” standards and the 
“best conventional technology” standards.  Both standards require 
the Agency to consider the costs of reducing pollutants and the “ef-
fluent reduction benefits.”38  To set BPT standards, for example, EPA 
must assess “the total cost of application of technology in relation to 
the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such applica-
tion.”39  To set BCT standards, the Agency must consider “the  rea-
 
Latin, supra note 34, at 1308. 
 36. Id. at 1307. 
 37. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(C)-(b)(2)(D). 
 38. Id. § 1314 (b)(1)(B), (b)(4)(B). 
 39. Id. § 1314(b)(1)(B).  EPA also must consider certain technical characteristics of the 
industry and the potential pollution control technology: “the age of equipment and facilities in-
volved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types of con-
trol techniques, [and] process changes.”  Id.  It must also consider the “non-water quality env i-
ronmental impact[s of using a control technology] (including [its] energy requirements),” 
because Congress wanted to ensure that a technology that reduced water pollutants did not turn 
around and create substantial solid wastes or air pollutants.  Id.  See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 
33,750  (1972) (reporting legislators’ intent to have EPA consider non-water quality environ-
mental impacts because “it would be foolhardy to credit one environmental account and debit 
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sonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduc-
tion in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived [there-
from].”40 
Congress required EPA to take costs into account to avoid im-
posing undue burdens on the regulated entitie s and the nation’s 
economy as a whole.41  For some industries it is simply not technically 
possible to eliminate all pollutants without ceasing operations alto-
gether.42  For other industries, even if it is technically possible, the 
elimination of pollutants with add-on controls or changes in produc-
tion methods may be very costly and lead to broader social costs.43  
For instance, products or services may become more expensive,44 and 
firms operating on the margin may no longer be able to remain com-
 
another by the same action”); id. at 33,763 (requiring EPA, in the context of a related provision, 
to consider energy requirements so as to make sure “the national interest in an adequate energy 
supply is expressly recognized”). 
 40. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B).  Like the BPT provision, EPA must also consider certain 
technical issues regarding the regulated entities and the control technologies, as well as the non-
water quality environmental impacts and energy requirements.  Id.  Unlike the BPT provision, 
the Agency must for the BCT standards also “compare the cost and level of reduction of such 
pollutants from the discharge from publicly owned treatment works to the cost and level of re-
duction of such pollutants from a class or category of industrial sources.”  Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 13, at 432-33 (describing BPT standards as “cost-
sensitive” and BAT standards as set at the level that is “affordable by most of the industry”).  
See also Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 23, at 1335 (showing technology-based standards set 
at level that “will not cause a shutdown of the plant or industry”). 
“Cost-sensitive” standards such as BPT or BAT limits are far different than standards justi-
fied by formal, monetized cost -benefit analyses, where “every dollar spent on technology must 
return at least a dollar in enhanced water quality.”  Rodgers, supra note 13, at 432.  Indeed, 
scholars have criticized technology-based standards precisely because they do not depend on a 
strict cost-benefit analysis, resulting in inefficient demands for pollutant reductions without any 
showing of environmental benefit.  See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 23, at 1335; 
Pedersen, supra note 14, at 76, 82-84. 
 42. See PAUL B. DOWNING, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 27 (1984) (rela t-
ing how an industry that produces a good or service that generates unwanted byproducts can 
only do one of three things to avoid releasing that byproduct: cease operations, change opera-
tions so as not to produce the byproduct, or install pollution control devices). 
 43. See, e.g., James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a 
Federal System—and Why it Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1232 (1995) (“The costs of pollution 
control, passed on to consumers, employers and employees, stockholders, and taxpayers are di-
verted from other worthy objectives.  In a world of scarce resources (our world, like it or not) 
the cost of every benefit is the value of some alternative benefit one could have realized in-
stead.”). 
 44. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond 
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOL. L.Q. 545, 568-70 (1997) (while not always true, 
sometimes consumer prices rise as environmental standa rds are imposed on an industry, as, for 
instance, when “consumers may have to pay higher prices” for electricity because of “pollution 
control requirements” on coal-fired utilities). 
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petitive, resulting in plant closures and job losses.45  It is these types of 
economic disruptions that Congress expected the Agency to avoid 
when imposing a technology-based standard.46 
By directing EPA to consider “effluent reduction benefits,” 
rather than referring to a level of “safety,” Congress intended to sig-
nal that the Agency need not use detailed risk information to pin-
point precisely how using a technology would protect the quality of a 
particular receiving water and the health of individuals who used that 
water, since efforts to do so had delayed implementation of the ear-
lier health-based program.47  Instead, to achieve prompt regulation, 
the legislature expected EPA to rely on simpler measures of the 
benefits gained by using a pollution control technology, such as, for 
example, merely counting the amount of pollutant that the technol-
ogy could eliminate from a facility’s effluent discharge.48  It is impor-
tant to recognize, however, that the underlying benefit of reducing 
pollutant discharges is, of course, a reduction in the risks that the pol-
lutants pose to public health and the environment.  Thus, even if EPA 
estimates the benefits of implementing control technologies by refer-
ring to nothing more than the quantities of pollutants they can re-
duce, the Agency is still regulating based on certain assumptions—
either implicit or explicit—related to risk.  It is assumed, for example, 
 
 45. William Boyd, Controlling Toxic Harms: The Struggle Over Dioxin Contamination in 
the Pulp and Paper Industry , 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 345, 385-86 (2002) (reporting EPA’s esti-
mates that compliance with limits on water and air discharges from the pulp and paper industry 
would “result in closure of eleven to thirteen mills, and lead to a loss of between 2,880 and 
10,700 jobs”). 
 46. See 118  CONG. REC. 33,749-50 (1972) (explaining that the “total cost of application 
technology . . . include[s] those internal, or plant, costs sustained by the owner or operator and 
those external cost s such as potential unemployment, dislocation, and rural area economic de-
velopment”).  
 47. See Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1044 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“The phrase 
‘effluent reduction benefits’ avoids any suggestion that receiving water quality is an issue.”); id. 
at 1042 (for the technology-based standards, Congress rejected any attempt “to assess the bene-
fits to particular bodies of receiving water,” because trying to show that precise relationship had 
so slowed down the prior regulatory scheme).  See also Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. 
McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 
729, 746-47 (describing how Congress rejected the “uncertainties and analytical quagmires con-
cerning risk assessment [that] were bogging down” the earlier regulatory programs in favor of 
technology-based standards). 
 48. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1044 n.49 (effluent reduction benefits “occur[] 
whenever less effluent is discharged”); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 801, 809 n.3 
(4th Cir. 1982) (when Congress directs EPA to consider “effluent reduction benefits,” it means 
“simply the benefits assumed to result . . . from any reduction in the level of effluents being dis-
charged,” not the precise health and environmental benefits that will result from the improved 
water quality). 
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that the pollutants being regulated are, in fact, harmful; that they are 
all equally toxic; and that reductions in the quantities discharged will 
correspond to reduced risks to public health and the environment.49  
Regardless, then, of the way that the Agency may choose to measure 
effluent reduction benefits, those benefits ultimately translate into 
“risk reduction benefits.”  This article will use that terminology to 
emphasize that public health and environmental risks remain the 
driving force—the raison d’etre—behind technology-based standards. 
In sum, in the BPT and BCT provisions Congress expressly es-
tablished two goals for EPA: first, to eliminate harmful water pollut-
ants to the extent possible with available control technologies and 
second, to do so without imposing excessive burdens on the economy.  
To reflect those dual aims, Congress directed EPA to consider both 
the costs and the risk reduction benefits of candidate technologies 
when selecting the “best” technology for an industry to implement. 
2. The Ambiguity of the “Best Available Technology” Provi-
sion 
With an understanding of BPT and BCT standards, the more 
stringent—and more ambiguous—provision of the Clean Water Act 
requiring industries to use the “best available” technology can better 
be examined.  Unlike the BPT and BCT provisions, the BAT provi-
sion does not expressly direct EPA to consider any “benefits” and 
simply requires the Agency to consider “the cost of achieving [an] ef-
fluent reduction.”50  Comparing the BAT provision with the BPT and 
BCT provisions, some courts have erroneously concluded that Con-
gress intended EPA not to consider the benefits of pollution control 
technologies.51  An internally contradictory legislative history seems 
to support that misinterpretation.  Senator Edmund Muskie (D-
Maine), one of the leaders in the enactment of the modern Clean Wa-
ter Act, stated: 
 
 49. See Triumph, supra  note 3, at 92 (technology-based standards “assum[e] that there is 
pollution, that it is undesirable, and that a strong effort to reduce the pollution is needed”).  
 50. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (2000).  Like the BPT and BCT provisions, it also directs 
EPA to take into account certain technical issues, such as the age of the equipment, as well as 
the non-water quality environmental impacts and energy requirements.  Id. 
 51. See, e.g., EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 (1980) (“in assessing BAT 
total cost is [not] to be considered in comparison to effluent reduction benefits”); Rybachek v. 
EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1990) (in setting BAT standards, EPA “need not compare 
such cost with the benefits of effluent reduction”); Reynolds Metals Co. v. EPA, 760 F.2d 549, 
565 (4th Cir. 1985) (discussing same); Nat’l Ass’n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 662 
n.64 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing same). 
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In making the determination of “best available” [technology] for a 
category or class, the [EPA] Administrator is expected to apply the 
same principles involved in making the determination of [best prac-
ticable technology, the lesser standard] except as to cost-benefit 
analysis. . . . While cost should be a factor in the Administrator’s 
judgment, no balancing test will be required.  The Administrator 
will be bound by a test of reasonableness .  In this case, the reason-
ableness of what is “economically achievable” should reflect an 
evaluation of what needs to be done to move toward the elimina-
tion of the discharge of pollutants and what is achievable through 
the application of available technology—without regard to cost.52 
That statement suffers from various inconsistencies.  One is 
whether costs should be evaluated at all when BAT standards are set.  
On the one hand, the Senator indicated that “cost should be a factor,” 
but on the other, he emphasized regulation “without regard to cost” 
(which is contrary to the statutory language).53  Another internal in-
consistency, and one even more important to the discussion at hand, 
relates to whether EPA should compare costs and benefits.  Senator 
Muskie said that no “cost-benefit analysis” should be done and “no 
balancing test will be required,”  which suggests, together with the ab-
sence in the BAT provision of any mention of “benefits,” that EPA 
should not weigh a technology’s benefits, only its costs. 
Such a literal reading of the statute would make no sense.  A de-
termination of the “best available” technology based only on its costs 
would logically lead to the conclusion that no technology should be 
required because, without any  benefits, the costs of any control tech-
nology would be unacceptable.  Obviously, given the overarching 
purpose of the Clean Water Act, which is to “restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s wa-
 
 52. 118 CONG. REC. 33,696  (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (emphasis added).  That 
quote comes from “exhibit 1” to Senator Muskie’s remarks, which includes a “discussion,” pre-
pared by the Senator, “of each of the significant provisions of the bill” as reported by the Con-
ference Committee).  See id. at 33,693.  Some courts mistakenly refer to Senator Muskie’s 
statements as the Conference Report itself.  See, e.g., Ass’n of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 
794, 817 (9th Cir. 1980).  
Senator Muskie’s role as the manager of the conference bill in 1972 has been well recog-
nized by the courts and, as a result, his comments have been given “significant weight.”  See, 
e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 791 F.2d 304, 311 n.13 (4th Cir. 1986), 
vacated, 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
 53. Indeed, that confusion led to a split among the circuits as to whether costs should be 
considered when selecting BAT standards.  See Pacific Fisheries, 615 F.2d at 817 (comparing 
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1361 (4th Cir. 1976), with Am. Iron & Steel 
Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1052 (3d Cir. 1975)). 
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ters,”54 Congress expected dischargers, in fact, to use costly control 
technologies and to do so to protect the citizenry from harmful pol-
lutants.55  Hence, just as for the BPT and BCT programs, the legisla-
ture had not one goal but two for the BAT program: first, to be mind-
ful of the costs of control, but second (and more importantly) to 
reduce the risks from discharges of toxic pollutants.  Implicit, then, in 
the BAT statutory provision must be a requirement that EPA also 
consider the extent to which pollution control technologies can offer 
risk reduction benefits, not just the technologies’ costs.56 
Unfortunately, because Senator Muskie indicated that “the 
[EPA] Administrator will be bound by a test of reasonableness” when 
judging which costs are “economically achievable,”57 some have in-
terpreted this to mean that EPA must establish BAT standards by se-
lecting the most stringent technology that would drive a “reasonable” 
number of marginal firms into bankruptcy, but not bankrupt an entire 
industry.58  That view, however, simply shifts the necessary considera-
 
 54. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).  See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality 
Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity , 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 29-31 
(2003) (discussing congressional intent to establish Clean Water Act goals of not only protecting 
the chemical integrity of the nation’s waters, but also their physical and biological integrity). 
 55. See Daniel C. Esty, What’s the Risk with Risk? , 13 YALE J. ON REG. 603, 603 (1996) 
(book review) (“Reducing risk is, almost by definition, the central purpose of environmental 
regulation.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 23, at 1341 (“A BAT system has an implicit 
environmental goal . . . .”).  In other words, even if one argued that Senator Muskie should be 
understood to mean that the “best” technology would be the cheapest one that had any ability 
to reduce pollutants, EPA would still have to make sure that a candidate technology at least had 
that very minimal impact, which is nothing more than a consideration of its benefits.  Moreover, 
that interpretation would elevate concern about the expense of the control method above con-
cern for its environmental impacts—hardly Congress’ intent. 
Thus, even though no mention is made of benefits in the statute, the provision should not 
be read literally using the maxim of exclusio unius est inclusio alterius.  Courts are often willing 
to reject nonsensical, literal readings of narrow statutory provisions in favor of more logical in-
terpretations based on the overall purposes of statute.  See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. 
Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993) (“Over and over we have stressed that ‘[i]n 
expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but 
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’”); Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 
U.S. 877, 890 (1989) (rejecting exclusio unius argument in favor of “the most reasonable inter-
pretation of the statute in light of its manifest purpose”).  See also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks 
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Con-
strued, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 403 (1950) (noting that for every canon such as exclusio unius, an 
opposite canon of statutory construction can be found). 
 57. 118 CONG. REC. 33,696  (1972) (emphasis added). 
 58. See, e.g., Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1051-52 (3d Cir. 1975) (quoting 
Senator Muskie’s statement and statement of another Senator to find that EPA has discretion to 
determine what level of “economic disruption” should be acceptable under a BAT standard, 
since “Congress clearly contemplated that cleaning up the nation’s waters might necessitate the 
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tion of risk reduction benefits to the determination of what a “rea-
sonable” number of bankruptcies would be.  Certainly Congress 
could not have intended to allow bankruptcies for their own sake, 
with no related benefits, but instead was willing to impose the costs of 
using pollution control technologies, including the loss of marginal 
firms, to improve public health and the environment by eliminating 
harmful pollutants.  Thus, Senator Muskie’s test of “reasonable” costs 
must be understood to mean “reasonable” in relation to the benefits 
derived.  The more risk reduction benefits achieved by adopting a cer-
tain control technology, the greater might be the “reasonable” num-
ber of firms bankrupted by a BAT standard that relies on that tech-
nology. 
Indeed, some courts have confirmed that, under the BAT prov i-
sion, the costs of using a technology must be reasonable compared to 
its benefits.  For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in American Petroleum Institute v. EPA agreed with the 
industry challengers that extremely costly technologies should not be 
imposed on the industry for only de minimis pollutant reductions.59  
According to the court, “EPA would disserve its mandate were it to 
tilt at windmills by imposing BAT limitations which removed de 
minimis amounts of polluting agents from our nation’s waters, while 
imposing possibly disabling costs upon the regulated industry.”60  
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA observed that “[a]t some point 
extremely costly[,] more refined treatment will have a de minimis ef-
fect on the receiving waters,”61 suggesting that at that point the 
Agency could properly declare the extremely costly treatment, even 
 
closing of some ma rginal plants”).  See also ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER, supra  note 
2, at 90-91 (describing “feasibility analysis” as demanding the most stringent, technically feasible 
controls that will not “close down an entire industry”); David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs 
of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (“The feasibility principle re-
flects a . . . preference for avoiding widespread plant shutdowns.”). 
 59. 787 F.2d 965, 972 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 60. Id. 
 61. 615 F.2d 794, 818 (9th Cir. 1980).  The court also noted that EPA had “concluded that 
the benefits justified the costs” of the BAT standards.  The opinion is confusing, however, be-
cause the Ninth Circuit also concluded, because of the “conspicuous absence” of “benefits” in 
the BAT statutory provision, that “Congress did not intend the Agency . . . to engage in ma r-
ginal cost-benefit analysis.”  Id. at 818.  If read broadly, that statement would suggest no weig h-
ing of both costs and benefits is required.  The better interpretation, however, given the court’s 
mention of “marginal” costs and benefits, is to understand that EPA need not find a close fit 
between the incremental benefits of using a technology more stringent than the BPT technology 
and its incremental costs, as the petitioners wanted.  Id. 
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though technically achievable, not to be the “best available” technol-
ogy, given the unreasonableness of the costs in relation to the public 
health and environmental benefits.62 
If, even for BAT standards, the costs are to be reasonable in light 
of the benefits, then what interpretation should be given to Senator 
Muskie’s ambiguous statements that no “cost-benefit analysis” was to 
be undertaken for a BAT standard and that no “balancing test will be 
required?”  As observed by some jurists, the Senator likely was trying 
to signal that for BAT standards—which, again, were intended to be 
the most stringent—EPA does not have to find as close a fit between 
the costs and benefits of a control technology as it would for a BPT 
standard.63  Instead, even a technology whose expense might not jus-
tify declaring it the “best practicable” could be declared the “best 
available.”64 
Thus, even though the risk reduction benefits of using a control 
technology are not mentioned as a factor in the Clean Water Act’s 
 
 62. Id.  See also Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1361 (4th Cir. 1976) (re-
jecting claim that “the benefits derived from a particular level of effluent reduction must be 
quantified in monetary terms,” but requiring EPA to consider non-monetized benefits to de-
termine whether a BAT standard would make “reasonable further progress” toward elimination 
of harmful discharges, as required by 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (2000)); American Petroleum 
Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1988) (implying that a BAT standard must at least pro-
vide “minimal environmental impact” that is “technologically and economically achievable”). 
 63. Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1075 n.15 (3d Cir. 1975) (concurrence by 
Adams, J.) (noting that even though the BAT provision does not specifically direct EPA to con-
sider costs in relation to benefits, it directs EPA to consider the costs, which implies “some kind 
of comparison of costs and benefits, although the proportionality between costs and benefits, 
indicated by section 304(b)(1)(B) [for BPT], would not seem to be required [for BAT]”); Wey-
erhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[A]ll factors, including costs and 
benefits are consideration[s]” for BAT standards, but the statute requires “more rigorous EPA 
consideration of cost versus benefit in the 1977 [BPT] standards than in the 1983 [BAT] stan-
dards.”).  See also Houck, supra note 19, at 462-63 & n.264 (noting Weyerhaeuser court’s ap-
proval of EPA’s use of “cost -benefit calculations” to set BAT standards). 
 64. See Rodgers, supra  note 13, at 432 (BAT standards do not require the “balancing calcu-
lus” required for BPT standards).  The real difference, then, between the BPT and BAT stan-
dards lies not in whether benefits are considered at all, but the level of economic disruption 
Congress was willing to accept for those benefits, with the greater costs being accepted for the 
more stringent BAT standards.  Indeed, Professor Rodgers has described the hierarchy among 
the various technology-based standards under the Clean Water Act, as follows: 
As Congress slices, dices, and refines, we are presented with BPT as an initial standard 
for industry, BCT a smidgen tougher, [BAT] tougher yet, and the new source stan-
dards the toughest of all.  Never mind that the first “best” is followed by three “better” 
yets. 
Rodgers, supra  note 13, at 420.  In reality, as Professor Rodgers also notes, EPA has actually 
softened the lines between those categories by “often equat[ing] the BPT and [BAT] control 
obligations,” so that a technology is declared to be both the “best practicable” and the “best 
available.”  Id. 
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BAT provision, and some statements in the legislative history might 
suggest that EPA is not to consider those benefits when setting a 
BAT standard, that illogical interpretation is not consistent with Con-
gress’ overall goals for the BAT program.  The Agency must know a 
technology’s risk reduction benefits—measured, if nothing else, by 
the amount of pollution it reduces—to determine whether it is the 
“best available.”   
3. EPA’s Method of Setting BAT Standards: Weighing Costs 
and Risk Reduction Benefits (Including Pollutant Toxici-
ties) 
Consistent with Congress’ expectation that EPA seek the maxi-
mum public health and environmental protection without imposing 
excessive burdens on the economy, risk reduction benefits (and obvi-
ously costs) have played a central role in EPA’s implementation of 
the BAT program.  In rulemakings spanning twenty-five years, the 
Agency has repeatedly selected as the “best available” those tech-
nologies whose costs were, in EPA’s judgment, reasonable in light of 
the benefits of eliminating the harmful pollutants at issue.65 
 
 65. As the Agency repeatedly stated in the early rulemakings for toxic pollutants, “in de-
veloping [a] proposed BAT [standard] . . . EPA has given substantial weight to the reasonable-
ness of costs,” with the Agency weighing “the volume and nature of the discharges, [and] . . . the 
general environmental effects of the pollutants” against “the costs and economic impacts of the 
required pollution control levels.”  See, e.g., Inorganic Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source 
Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Perform-
ance Standards, 45 Fed. Reg. 49,450, 49,454-55 (proposed July 24, 1980) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 415) (emphasis added); Porcelain Enameling; Point Source Category Effluent Limita-
tions Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 8860, 8864 (proposed Jan. 27, 1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 466); Electroplating 
and Metal Finishing Point Source Categories; Limitations, Guidelines and Standards, 48 Fed. 
Reg. 32,462, 32,467 (July 15, 1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 413 & 433); Nonferrous Me t-
als Forming and Iron and Steel/Copper/Aluminum Metal Powder Production and Powder Me t-
allurgy Point Source Category Limitations, Guidelines and Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8112, 8123 
(proposed Mar. 5, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 471); Ore Mining and Dressing Point 
Source Category; Gold Placer Mining; Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Per-
formance Standards, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,982, 47,995 (Nov. 20, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
440). 
After 1985, although EPA did not expressly refer to seeking “reasonable” costs, it certainly 
continued that notion by seeking, for instance, to “mitigate [the] adverse economic impacts” on 
the industry under review without sacrificing “the toxic pound equivalents being removed under 
the proposed rule.”  Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Metal Products and 
Machinery Point Source Category, 66 Fed. Reg. 424, 460 (proposed Jan. 3, 2001) (to be  codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 413, 433, 438, 463, 464, 467 & 471).  Similarly, EPA sought “cost-effective” con-
trols, based on a comparison of costs and risk reduction benefits.  See infra  text accompanying 
notes 71-74. 
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EPA could have evaluated the public health and environmental 
risks and the corresponding risk reduction benefits by considering 
only the amounts of pollutants candidate technologies could reduce, 
making the assumption that all pollutants were equally toxic.66  In-
stead, EPA has measured those risk reduction benefits in a slightly 
more sophisticated manner, by considering both the quantity of pol-
lutant a control technology could reduce and the pollutant’s “na-
ture”—namely, its relative toxicity compared to other pollutants—as 
established in prior water quality criteria proceedings.67 
 
The costs and economic impacts of the pollution controls—against which EPA explicitly or 
implicitly compared the risk reduction benefits—were assessed by a number of different meas-
ures, including the capital expenses to install a pollution control technology and its annual ope r-
ating costs; the increase in the consumer price of the goods or services provided by the plant; the 
number of plants or production lines anticipated to close if costs could not be passed on to con-
sumers; and the number of workers that likely would become unemployed.  See, e.g., Inorganic 
Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment 
Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 45 Fed. Reg. at 49,461; Organic Chemicals 
and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards, 52 
Fed. Reg. 42,522, 42,539 (Nov. 5, 1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 414 & 416); Pesticide 
Chemicals Manufacturing Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 12,560, 12,572 (proposed Apr. 10, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 455); Centralized 
Waste Treatment Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards, 60 Fed. Reg. 5464, 
5494 (proposed Jan. 27, 1995) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 437); Meat and Poultry Products 
Point Source Category Effluent Limitations and Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. 8582, 8608-15 (pro-
posed Feb. 25, 2002) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 432). 
 66. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. 
 67. See, e.g., Inorganic Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Category Effluent Limita-
tions Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 45 Fed. 
Reg. at 49,454 (considering the “volume and nature” of the pollutants at issue) (emphasis 
added); Porcelain Enameling; Point Source Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pre-
treatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 46 Fed. Reg. at 8864 (discussing 
same); Ele ctroplating and Metal Finishing Point Source Categories; Limitations, Guidelines and 
Standards, 48 Fed. Reg. at 32,467 (discussing same); Nonferrous Metals Forming and Iron and 
Steel/Copper/Aluminum Metal Powder Production and Powder Metallurgy Point Source Cate-
gory Limitations, Guidelines and Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. at 8123 (discussing same); Ore Mining 
and Dressing Point Source Category; Gold Placer Mining; Effluent Limitations Guidelines and 
New Source Performance Standards, 50 Fed. Reg. at 47,995 (discussing same). 
As noted earlier, water quality criteria indicate the amount of a pollutant that could be al-
lowed in a waterway without disrupting the use of the water for drinking, fishing, or other pur-
poses.  See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.  EPA explains that water quality criteria are 
based on “data and scientific judgments on the relationship between pollutant concentrations 
and environmental and human health effects.”  National Recommended Water Quality Criteria, 
63 Fed. Reg. 68,354, 68,354 (Dec. 10, 1998) (collecting the latest water quality criteria and de-
scribing process for setting same).  See also NRDC v. EPA, 806 F. Supp. 1263, 1269 (E.D. Va. 
1992) (“Numeric water criteria to protect human health [are] based on an assessment of the 
dose of [the pollutant] that may cause harm and the dose to humans that can be expected as a 
result of the [pollutant] present in the water.”). 
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Based on the water quality criteria, EPA has created the concept 
of a “pound-equivalent,” which refers to one pound of a substance 
with the toxicity of a particular reference pollutant—copper—against 
which other pollutants’ toxicities are compared.68  That notion allows 
EPA to calculate not simply the absolute amount of pollution that a 
control technology would reduce but an amount expressed in pounds-
equivalent that reflected the nature of the pollutant.69  For instance, a 
reduction of one pound of a pollutant less toxic than copper would ac-
tually be represented by only a fraction of a pound-equivalent, and a 
reduction of one pound of a more toxic pollutant would be repre-
sented by several pounds-equivalent.70 
With information about the pounds-equivalent that candidate 
technologies could eliminate, the Agency has then calculated the 
“cost-effectiveness” of each control technology, which measures its 
cost to remove one pound-equivalent.71  That calculation has served 
as an important factor in EPA’s choices of the “best available” tech-
nologies.  The Agency stated in 2002, for instance, that “in recently 
promulgated effluent guidelines, EPA has relied primarily on the 
toxic pollutant cost-effectiveness measure for evaluating BAT.”72  In 
 
 68. See, e.g., Nonferrous Metals Forming and Metal Powders Point Source Category; Cop-
per Forming Point Source Category; Effluent Limitations and Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 34,242, 
34,255 (Aug. 23, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 468 & 471) (describing  the process of cal-
culating pounds-equivalent, including the use of copper’s water quality criterion as the weight-
ing factor); Industrial Waste Combustor Subcategory of the Waste Combustors Point Source 
Category, Effluent Limitations and Guidelines, 63 Fed. Reg. 6392, 6411 (proposed Feb. 6, 1998) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 444) (describing “toxicity normalized units called ‘pound-
equivalents’”). 
 69. See, e.g., Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent Limi-
tations Guidelines and Standards, 52 Fed. Reg. at 42,552 (“A pound-equivalent is calculated by 
multiplying the number of pounds of a pollutant by the toxic weighting factor for that pollutant.  
The weighting factors give relatively more weight to more highly toxic pollutants.”).  See, e.g., 
Iron and Steel Manufacturing Point Source Category Effluent Limitations Guideline and Stan-
dards, 67 Fed. Reg. 64,216, 64,249 (Oct. 17, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 420) (“[t]he 
more toxic the pollutant, the higher will be the pollutant’s toxic weighting factor”). 
 70. See, e.g., Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category Effluent Limitations Guide-
lines and Standards, 60 Fed. Reg. 9428, 9446 (proposed Feb. 17, 1995) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 435) (representing 3.9 million absolute pounds of pollutants that would be reduced as 
only 1264 toxic pound-equivalents). 
 71. See, e.g., Iron and Steel Manufacturing Point Source Category Effluent Limitations 
Guideline and Standards, 67 Fed. Reg. at 64,249 (“The analysis compares the total annualized 
cost incurred for a regulatory option to the corresponding effectiveness of that option in reduc-
ing the discharge of pollutants,” that is, the estimated pounds-equivalent to be eliminated by 
this technology, so that the “cost-effectiveness value represents the unit cost of removing an ad-
ditional pound-equivalent.”). 
 72. Meat and Poultry Products Point Source Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines and 
Standards, 67 Fed. Reg. 8582, 8619 (proposed Feb. 25, 2002) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 432).  
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another rulemaking it wrote that while a cost-effectiveness analysis is 
“not required by the Clean Water Act,” it is “a useful tool for evalu-
ating regulatory options for the removal of toxic pollutants.”73  In-
deed, some technologies have not been deemed the “best available” 
precisely because their costs per pound-equivalent were relatively 
high.74 
 
This is not a new development.  The Agency began analyzing the cost -effectiveness of the con-
trol options in the early 1980s.  See, e.g., Inorganic Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Cate-
gory Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards, 48 Fed. Reg. 49,408, 49,420 (proposed Oct. 
25, 1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 415); Pesticide Chemicals Manufacturing Category Efflu-
ent Limitations Guidelines and Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,560, 12,572 (proposed Apr. 10, 1992) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 455) (in setting BAT limits, “the Agency takes into consideration 
factors such as plant closures, product line closures, and total cost-effectiveness (dollar per 
pound-equivalent removal)”) (emphasis added).  See also Reynolds Metals Co. v. EPA, 760 F.2d 
549, 565-66 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining EPA’s use in a 1983 BAT rulemaking of pound-
equivalents, standardized to the toxicity of copper, to determine the “cost-effectiveness” of 
various control options).  
 EPA goes so far as to convert the costs into 1981 dollars “so that comparisons of the cost-
effectiveness among regulated industries can be made.”  See, e.g., Oil and Gas Extraction Point 
Source Category Offshore Subcategory Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 12,454, 12,492 (Mar. 4, 1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 435); Oil and Gas Extra ction 
Point Source Category, Coastal Subcategory Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards, 60 
Fed. Reg. 9428, 9466 (proposed Feb. 17, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 435) (similar); 
Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 18,504, 18,583 (Apr. 15, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 3, 261 & 430) (similar). 
 73. Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Perform-
ance Standards for the Iron and Steel Manufacturing Point Source Category, 67 Fed. Reg. 
64,216, 64,249 (Oct. 17, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 420).  See also Effluent Limitations 
Guidelines and Pretreatment Standards for the Industrial Laundries Point Source Category, 64 
Fed. Reg. 45,072, 45,077 (proposed Aug. 18, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 441) (empha-
sizing that it was not required by the Clean Water Act to consider cost-effectiveness when se t-
ting a BAT standard, but the analysis was helpful “to determine which option along a spectrum 
of options is most efficient”). 
 74. See, e.g., Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for 
the Metal Products and Machinery Point Source Category, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,686, 25,705 (May 13, 
2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 438) (rejecting a technology as the basis for a BAT stan-
dard, even though it would not cause excessive number of bankruptcies, because its costs “are 
disproportionate to the estimated toxic pollutant reductions.  EPA estimates compliance costs 
of $0.3 million (2001 [dollars]) with only 186 toxic pound-equivalents (PE) being removed.  This 
equates to a cost-effectiveness value (in 1981 [dollars]) of approximately $900/PE.”); id. at 
25,707 (similar reasoning for a different subcategory of the industry).  See also Textile Mills 
Point Source Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards and New 
Source Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 38,810, 38,814 (Sept. 2, 1982) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 410) (rejecting a technology as the basis for a BAT standard after analyzing, inter alia , 
“the cost per pound of pollutant removed by the proposed BAT standard,” and finding that cost 
“significantly higher than that of other industries for which BAT limitations have been estab-
lished,” and ultimately concluding that the “costs of additional removal of [pollutants] and the 
economic impact do not justify further control”). 
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Setting a BAT standard, then, should not be seen as merely a 
technocratic inquiry about which pollution control methods are avail-
able to an industry, but a value-laden political judgment to be made 
by EPA policymakers.75  The Agency must decide whether to reject a 
technology that can be implemented as a matter of engineering be-
cause, in EPA’s view, the costs are unreasonable compared to the risk 
reduction benefits available from that technology, as reflected by the 
quantity and toxic nature of the pollutant it would reduce.76  Where 
exactly to draw the line between reasonable and unreasonable costs—
and hence the line between the “best available” technology and other 
technologies—depends strictly on the Agency’s policy preferences. 
C. The Failure of Courts to Give APA Review to the Agency’s Calcu-
lations of Risk Reduction Benefits Under the BAT Program 
The Administrative Procedure Act is designed to ensure the ac-
countability of unelected agency officials by requiring all rulemakings 
to be transparent to the citizenry, the President, Congress, and re-
viewing courts, thus facilitating the political and judicial oversight 
necessary to prevent an agency from violating the mandates of its 
governing statute or from abusing the discretion left to it by the legis-
 
 75. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory 
Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 315-16 (1992) (The selection of 
technology-based standards is “merely a surrogate, and not necessarily an accurate one, for the 
underlying tradeoff of health versus cost.”); Ada m Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental 
Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 174 (2003) (“Setting technology-based standards, of course, 
requires coming to grips with the issue of economic feasibility, . . . [which] implies a value judg-
ment about the point at which risk reduction becomes too expensive to make sense . . . .”); John 
D. Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens Under Sec-
tion 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 140 (“BAT is inevitably chosen with implicit 
cost-benefit considerations.”).  
One policymaker might believe that a technology should be rejected only if its costs are 
“extremely high” compared to “little” environmental benefit.  Another policymaker might 
agree with that standard but not agree on what counts as “little” environmental benefit or an 
“extremely high” cost.  Other decisionmakers, on the other hand, might believe that the costs 
should be “proportionate” to the benefits, but amongst themselves not agree on the precise 
meaning of “proportionate.” 
 76. Looking to only limited information about the quantity and nature of the pollutant that 
a control technology could eliminate was consistent with Congress’ intent for the BAT program.  
The legislature did not want it to bog down in all the ma ny complex questions involved in trying 
to precisely determine, as under a health-based program, the distance the pollutant traveled 
from a facility under study, the number of persons living in the vicinity, how they might come 
into contact with the pollutant, and what likelihood of harm they would face.  See supra  text ac-
companying notes 47-49. 
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lature.77  Three key aspects of the APA—as interpreted by hundreds 
of judicial decisions—are intended to foster agency transparency and 
accountability.78  First, an agency must give public notice of its rule, 
explaining the rule’s purposes and the factual and policy bases for it.79  
Second, the agency must receive and respond meaningfully to public 
 
 77. As Professor McGarity has so aptly stated:  “Transparency is a general desiderata for 
all regulatory decisionmaking because it helps ensure agency fidelity to statutory policies and 
thereby increases the confidence of affected citizens in the integrity of the decisionmaking proc-
ess.”  Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s Imple-
mentation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 203 (2001).  The need for 
transparency extends even to those issues in environmental regulation that may ostensibly be 
“scientific” because they, no less than any other issues, always involve policy choices.  See A. 
Dan Tarlock, Who Owns Science?, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 143 (2002) (“Science has 
no special claim to immunity from public scrutiny  . . . .”).  Transparency in environmental deci-
sionmaking not only leads to democratically legitimate decisions by “incorporating public values 
into [those] decisions,” but also “increas[es] the substantive quality of [those] decisions,” and 
“resolv[es] conflict among competing interests.”  See Thomas C. Beierle & Jerry Cayford, Envi-
ronmental Decision Making: What Does Public Participation Add? , 28 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 
6 (2003).  But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The ADA as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1479, 1484-87 (2001) (laying out arguments that, in fact, the public has “irrational” perceptions 
of risks and, thus, risk regulation should be left to the “expert” agencies without much public 
input). 
The APA governs EPA’s actions under the Clean Water Act.  See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 822 
F.2d 104, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing earlier decisions).  The Clean Air Act has its own rulema k-
ing and judicial review provisions, modeled on the APA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b), (d) (2000).  
This article will refer to the procedures and judicial review “under the APA” to mean both un-
der the APA and under the analogous provisions of the Clean Air Act. 
 78. The APA has been described as a “procedural constitution” whose details have been 
filled in—and, some might say, created out of whole cloth—not by the legislature but by revie w-
ing courts.  See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 89, 90 
(1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 79. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000) (requiring notice of proposed rule); id. § 553(c) (requiring 
notice of final rule to explain its “basis and purpose”).  The requirement to provide a “concise 
general statement of basis and purpose” for a final rule “has blossomed into a requirement that 
agencies provide a ‘reasoned explanation’ for rules.”  Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 
“Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400 (1992) [hereinafter Deossifying 
Rulemaking].  See also Charles H. Koch, Jr., 1 Administrative Law and Practice § 4.45 (2d ed. 
1997) (“basis and purpose” of rule is understood to mean the Agency’s findings of fact and pol-
icy judgments).  The Clean Air Act specifically requires rulemakings to include “a summary of 
the factual data on which the proposed rule is based [and] . . . and the major legal interpreta-
tions and policy considerations underlying the proposed rule.”  42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3)(A) & 
(C). 
Technically the  APA requirements only apply to legislative rules, as opposed to procedural 
rules, interpretive rules, and policy statements.  Id. § 553(b)(3)(A).  Technology-based stan-
dards clearly constitute legislative rules subject to the publication requirements of the APA.  
See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the 
Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1321-27 
(1992) (explaining differences among le gislative rules, interpretive rules, and policy statements). 
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comments on the proposed rule.80  Third, an agency’s regulation can 
be challenged in court,81 where judges can invalidate the rule if, inter 
alia, the agency failed to follow required rulemaking procedures, ex-
ceeded its statutory authority, or made an arbitrary or capricious de-
cision.82 
Although EPA did, in fact, candidly explain in the preambles for 
its proposed BAT rules the risk reduction benefits offered by the con-
trol technologies under study, and also took and responded to public 
comments on the Agency’s estimations of those benefits,83 the 
courts—at EPA’s urging and contrary to reason—have failed to give 
appropriate judicial scrutiny under the APA to those benefits calcula-
tions.  In American Iron & Steel Institute (“AISI”) v. EPA,84 for in-
stance, decided in the early years of the BAT program, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that EPA had 
prepared “cost-benefit diagrams” for the BAT standards for the iron 
and steel manufacturing industry,85 and had found, in the Agency’s 
 
 80. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring agencies to “give interested persons an opportunity to par-
ticipate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments”); Deossify-
ing Rulemaking , supra  note 79, at 1400 (agencies “must rationally respond to outside comments 
passing a threshold requirement of materiality”) (quote marks and citations omitted). 
 81. A petitioner must overcome several different hurdles to be heard.  For instance, the 
agency action must not be entirely committed to the agency’s discretion.  See 5 U.S.C. § 
701(a)(2).  The petitioner must have standing.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 
(1992).  It must have exhausted all mandatory administrative remedies.  Darby v. Cisneros, 509 
U.S. 137, 147 (1993).  The agency action must be final and ripe for review.  Abbott Labs. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); 5 U.S.C. § 704.  And the case must not be moot.  Friends 
of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 189-90 (2000).  In addition, the court can only hear issues 
that were first brought to the agency’s attention during the public comment period.  Etelson v. 
OPM, 684 F.2d 918, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 82. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C), (D).  While this article assumes for the sake of argument 
that judicial review serves the valuable purpose of reigning in otherwise unchecked agencies, 
many scholars have long debated whether judicial review of agency action actually serves the 
public good either in theory or in practice.  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case 
for Judicial Review of Rulemaking , 85 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1999) (disputing theoretical justifica-
tions for such judicial review); Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C.  L. REV. 1013 (2000) (documenting adverse, pragmatic conse-
quences of judicial review of agency action); Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability 
in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 690 (1990) (“Today, some of the most respected 
commentators in the field offer pointed and often biting criticisms of the courts’ place in the 
administrative process”); KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE 106 (3d. ed. 1994) (describing judicial review as a part of the “problem” of gov-
ernance).  Those important arguments are beyond the scope of this article and are reserved for 
another day. 
 83. See supra text accompanying notes 65-74. 
 84. 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 85. Id. at 1053. 
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words, that the “benefits of thus reducing the pollutants discharged 
justif[ied] the associated costs” of those standards.86  The petitioners 
sought to challenge the Agency’s calculations of the benefits as “in-
adequate and conclusory,” but the court—based on the flawed pre-
sumption that those benefits calculations were not “required” to se-
lect a BAT standard—refused to address the petitioners’ claim.87  If 
the benefits calculations were not “required,” the court reasoned, 
then EPA certainly was not compelled to perform them in any par-
ticular fashion, and hence, the court would not review the Agency’s 
methodology.88 
The AISI court not only failed to recognize the inherent need for 
EPA to consider risk reduction benefits when setting a BAT stan-
dard, but also ignored the fact that the Agency had considered them 
as a basis for these particular standards.  To be fair, at the time of this 
early decision, jurists were just beginning to make sense of the very 
complex technology-based provisions of the Clean Water Act and the 
confusing legislative history, which seemed to support the court’s 
conclusion.89  No subsequent court, however, has ever reversed the 
AISI error by correctly ruling that EPA must consider a technology’s 
risk reduction benefits and the courts must review those benefits con-
siderations under the APA.  In fact, the same faulty analysis of AISI 
 
 86. Id. (quoting Iron and Steel Manufacturing Point Source Category, 39 Fed. Reg. 24,114, 
24,118 (June 28, 1974) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 420)). 
 87. Id. at 1052 n.54.  That view matches the position of some scholars who distinguish tech-
nology-based standards from cost-benefit regulatory schemes, suggesting that for the former 
EPA simply determines which pollution control technology is “feasible,” which does not depend 
on any weighing of the costs and benefits of using a technology.  See, e.g., Environmental Strate-
gies, supra  note 2, at 160 (distinguishing the “technology-based approach” from the “‘balancing’ 
approach that weights media-quality considerations against technological and economic consid-
erations”); JOHN D. GRAHAM, LAURA C. GREEN & MARC J. ROBERTS, IN SEARCH OF SAFETY: 
CHEMICALS AND CANCER RISK 96-100, 105-08 (1988) (contrasting concepts of “lowest feasible 
risk” and “balancing of costs and benefits”); Driesen, supra  note 58, at 3 (setting up a “compari-
son between CBA [cost-benefit analysis] and the feasibility principle”).  To be sure, a formal, 
monetized comparison of costs and benefits is not required in selecting the “best” technology—
whether “best practicable,” “best available,” or “best” anything else —but the question of 
whether a technology is “feasible” (or, similarly, “available”) necessarily hinges, at least in some 
vague way, on whether its costs are worth its benefits.  Cf. Ackerman & Stewart, supra  note 23, 
1359 n.60 (almost any technology would be “available” if we were willing to spend “hundreds of 
billions of dollars,” but we are not so inclined).  
 88. AISI, 526 F.2d at 1052 n.54. 
 89. The AISI court, for instance, quoted Senator Muskie’s ambiguous statements about the 
BAT program.  526 F.2d at 1051-52.  See supra text accompanying notes 52-64 for a discussion of 
the confusion created by his remarks. 
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was repeated in a more recent Fifth Circuit case, suggesting the judi-
ciary’s continuing confusion about the BAT program.90 
In Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA,91 which involved challenges to 
the BAT standards for coastal oil and gas producers, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that EPA had conducted a 
“10-Facility Study to estimate [the] pollution reduction benefits” of 
various options to minimize effluent dischargers from those sources.92  
The Agency had calculated the amount of pollution each control op-
tion would reduce annually and converted those quantities into “toxic 
pounds-equivalent.”93  EPA’s analysis of the cost-effectiveness of 
each option—the cost to remove one pound-equivalent of toxic dis-
charge—clearly served as part of the basis for its choice of the BAT 
standards.94 
In court the industry petitioners sought to challenge EPA’s cal-
culations of the benefits, arguing that the 10-Facility Study had used 
information from sources that did not represent the industry as a 
whole.95  The Agency claimed, however, that the benefits calculations 
served no role in EPA’s selection of the BAT standards and were in-
cluded in the rulemaking for an entirely different purpose.96  The 
Texas Oil court—despite the evidence and logic to the contrary—
 
 90. Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 936. 
 93. See, e.g., Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source 
Performance Standards: Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category, Coastal Subcategory, 
60 Fed. Reg. 9428, 9446-47 (proposed Feb. 17, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 435) (ex-
plaining that one control option “would result in the removal of approximately 3.9 million 
pounds of pollutants being discharged per year (or 1264 pounds in toxic equivalents)” and an-
other option would remove “23 million pounds of pollutants . . .  (or 7375 toxic pounds equiva-
lent)”) (emphasis added). 
 94. See, e.g., id. (in the proposed rule, raising doubts about control options because of, inter 
alia, “the high cost -effectiveness results” for the controls and soliciting comment on same).  In 
EPA’s language “high cost -effectiveness” is not, as one might think, a good thing, as in “highly 
cost-effective;” rather, EPA means that the cost to remove one pound-equivalent was relatively 
high.  Id. at 9447 (“The $3.9 million annually incurred by industry to remove the 3760 pounds of 
priority toxic pollutants indicates that this option is not cost-effective.”).  In the final rule, EPA 
also considered the ratio of costs to pounds-equivalent removed, though at that time, interest-
ingly, it found the control options cost-effective.  Final Effluent Limitations Guidelines and 
Standards for the Coastal Subcategory of the Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category, 61 
Fed. Reg. 66,086, 66,110 (Dec. 16, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 435). 
 95. Tex. Oil, 161 F.3d at 935-36. 
 96. EPA argued that it had calculated the benefits, not to help it choose the “best” tech-
nology, but because the statute requires the Agency to identify the “degree of effluent reduction 
attaina ble through the application of BAT.”  Id. at 936 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(A) 
(2000)). 
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adopted EPA’s position, and ruled, like the AISI court, that it would 
not hear any challenge to the benefits calculations because they were 
not “required” for the BAT determination and, thus, could not serve 
as a reason to overturn the BAT standards.97 
The Fifth Circuit relied on two lines of cases to reach its errone-
ous conclusion.  First, it cited EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n,98 
in which the United States Supreme Court noted that Congress did 
not list “effluent reduction benefits” as a factor to be evaluated by 
EPA when it identifies the “best available” technology, but did spec-
ify that factor for the Agency to use when identifying the “best practi-
cable” technology.99  From this, the high court suggested in dictum 
that a technology’s benefits do not play a role in the selection of BAT 
standards.100  However, as noted earlier, such a literal reading of the 
statute is inappropriate since the “best” technology—whether it is the 
“best available” or the “best practicable” or “best” anything else—by 
definition cannot be identified without knowing the risk reduction 
benefits it offers.101 
Second, Texas Oil cited American Petroleum Institute (“API”) v. 
EPA,102 which is one of several earlier cases that addressed a slightly 
different issue than the one before the  Texas Oil court.  In API, the 
industry challengers claimed that the Agency should have calculated 
precisely how a BAT standard would improve water quality, because 
they believed the discharge that EPA was seeking to regulate 
“pose[d] no environmental threat when discharged in . . . relatively 
small volumes.”103  The court disagreed, finding that the exact “impact 
of a particular discharge upon the receiving water is not an issue to be 
considered in setting technology-based limitations.”104  API and simi-
lar cases are consistent with the legislative history of the Clean Water 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. 449 U.S. 64 (1980), cited in Tex. Oil, 161 F.3d at 936. 
 99. Id. at 70-71 (observing differences between sections 304(b)(1)(B) and 304(b)(2)(B) of 
the Clean Water Act). 
 100. Id.  It was dictum because the case did not involve BAT standards and instead only 
dealt with the question of whether, for BPT standards, EPA had to provide a variance for cer-
tain facilities.  Id. at 72.  Nevertheless, that statement has been given considerable weight by 
lower courts.  See, e.g., Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1990); Nat’l Ass’n of 
Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 662 n.64 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56. 
 102. 858 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1988), cited in Tex. Oil, 161 F.3d at 936. 
 103. Id. at 265. 
 104. Id. at 266.  Other cases likewise have held that EPA “need not document specifically 
the benefits to society from the curtailment of pollutants from a particular point source.”  Cal. & 
Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. EPA, 553 F.2d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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Act’s technology-based standards because Congress rejected earlier, 
prolonged efforts to assess exactly how a given pollution level would 
affect water quality or the health of the individuals that relied on that 
water.105  That EPA need not determine the risk reduction benefits 
precisely says nothing, however, about whether the Agency must have 
even a general sense of those benefits, as indicated, for instance, by 
the quantity and nature of the pollutant that a control technology will 
reduce.  Thus, the Texas Oil opinion’s reliance on API was misplaced. 
Decisions such as AISI and Texas Oil have plainly frustrated the 
goals of the APA by failing to review EPA’s estimations of the risk 
reduction benefits, thereby leaving the Agency with unfettered dis-
cretion in the BAT standard setting process where—without the 
threat of judicial scrutiny—it can make arbitrary assessments of the 
control technologies’ benefits.  Moreover, AISI and Texas Oil create 
the opportunity for EPA, in future BAT rulemakings, to entirely 
withhold from the public its evaluations of those risk reduction bene-
fits.  After all, if judges mistakenly believe that a benefits calculation 
is not required for BAT standards, then the courts will not police 
EPA’s behavior, requiring it to openly explain that factor in its Fed-
eral Register notices or take and respond to public comments on it.106  
Fortunately, it appears that EPA has continued to disclose its consid-
erations of the risk reduction benefits offered by candidate technolo-
gies in its BAT rules under the Clean Water Act.107  However, the po-
tential for abuse under that program remains.  In fact, as discussed in 
the next section, that very real potential has been realized in a similar 
program under the Clean Air Act, with EPA withholding from the 
citizenry and the judiciary key information about the risk reduction 
benefits of its technology-based standards. 
 
 105. As one court said, EPA does not have to pinpoint the health and environmental bene-
fits because “Congress, in its legislative wisdom, has determined that the many intangible bene-
fits of clean water justify vesting the Administrator with broad discretion” to impose costly 
technologies on industries.  FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1976).  See also 
Reed, supra  note 17, at 10,035 (summarizing cases that “erased any doubt about whether water 
quality impact is relevant” to one particular context, the “BPT variance proceedings”). 
 106. Indeed, these types of decisions might even create an incentive for EPA to do so be-
cause it might be hesitant to include its benefits calculations in a rulemaking when the language 
and legislative history of the Clean Water Act, as interpreted by the courts, not only suggest 
those benefits considerations are not required but might suggest they are not permitted. 
 107. See, e.g., Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for 
the Concentrated Aquatic Animal Production Point Source Category, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,872, 
57,912 (proposed Sept. 12, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 451) (presenting the Agency’s 
“environmental benefits analysis”).  
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III.  THE CLEAN AIR ACT’S TECHNOLOGY-BASED STANDARDS 
A. Legislative History: A Similar Shift from Health-Based to        
Technology-Based Standards 
 
EPA failed miserably in its efforts to regulate hazardous air pol-
lutants under the early health-based scheme of the Clean Air Act, 
which required the Agency not only to identify the pollutants that 
were likely to cause an increase in death or serious illness, but also to 
set emission limits for those pollutants at a level that would provide 
an “ample margin of safety” to protect public health.108  In twenty 
years, the Agency only identified eight hazardous air pollutants and 
adopted “ample margin of safety” standards for a small fraction of 
the industries emitting those pollutants.109  The delays were due in 
large part to EPA’s difficulty in deciding, as a matter of public policy, 
which level of pollution should be deemed “safe.”110  They were also 
caused by the great deal of time and resources it took to calculate the 
exact risks from regulated sources, with the Agency relying on com-
plex quantitative risk assessments that attempted to determine the 
dose-response curves for the pollutants, the distances and directions 
the pollutants traveled in the air, the population densities in the paths 
of the pollutants and the likely exposure routes.111  As Senator Steven 
 
 108. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1970) (recodified in 1977) (current version at 42 
U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2000)). 
 109. See S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 131 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3516 
(describing EPA’s delays). 
 110. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 252-
62 (1990); Sanford E. Gaines, Science, Politics, and the Management of Toxic Risks Through 
Law, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 271, 278-90 (1990) (analyzing the scientific, legal, and political uncer-
tainties that hindered EPA’s regulation of hazardous air pollutants); Patricia Ross McCubbin, 
Amending the Clean Air Act to Establish Democratic Legitimacy for the Residual Risk Program, 
22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8-10 (2003).  
 111. Graham, supra  note 75, at 118-19 (noting EPA’s reliance on lengthy, quantitative risk 
assessments).  The National Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, 
issued a seminal report in 1983 identifying “dose -response assessment” and “exposure assess-
ment” as two of the key elements of a risk assessment.  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK 
ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 3 (1983).  A dose-
response assessment is typically determined by extrapolating from studies of laboratory animals 
exposed to the pollutant at doses far higher than usual human exposures.  Mark Eliot Shere, 
The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 432-40 
(1995).  An exposure assessment considers the dispersion of the pollutants under study and the 
numbers and chara cteristics of persons living in that trajectory.  Id. at 441. 
The science of risk assessment has been described (and criticized) extensively in other lit-
erature.  See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique 
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D. Symms (R-Idaho) explained, the Clean Air Act “has regulated air 
toxics [also called hazardous air pollutants] under the health-based 
standards . . . . But because the health risks from these kinds of pol-
lutants are so vague and ill-defined, writing a standard that was 
soundly based in science has taken an extraordinary amount of 
time.”112 
Frustrated by EPA’s slow pace, in 1990 Congress directed the 
Agency to establish technology-based standards—modeled on the 
Clean Water Act’s provisions—as the main tool to regulate hazardous 
air pollutants.113  The legislature anticipated that the technology-
based program could be implemented more expeditiously than the 
prior health-based program, primarily because EPA would not need 
to rely on cumbersome quantitative risk assessments.114  In addition, 
Congress itself identified the 189 hazardous air pollutants to be regu-
lated, rather than requiring the Agency to spend the time and re-
sources to identify them.115  Finally, the legislature eased EPA’s ad-
ministrative burden by declaring a minimum standard that all 
 
of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992); Robert R. Kuehn, The Environ-
mental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103; Howard 
Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988).  
 112. 136 CONG. REC. 3495  (1990) (statement of Rep. Symms).  See also S. REP. NO. 101-228, 
at 171 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3556 (explaining that the legislators re-
jected “the kind of lengthy study and debate” involved in quantitative risk assessments because 
they have “crippled the current program”). 
 113. Pub. L. No. 101-549 § 301, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) 
(2000)).  See S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 155 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3540 
(describing EPA’s delays, observing that there is “now a broad consensus” to authorize EPA to 
use technology-based standards, and explaining analogy to the Clean Water Act).  As a supple-
ment to the new technology-based standards, Congress established the “Residual Risk” pro-
gram, which would continue to require health-based “ample margin of safety” standards to ad-
dress any emissions remaining after sources complied with the technology-based standards.  42 
U.S.C. § 7412(f); McCubbin, supra  note 110, at 34-35 (describing relationship between the tech-
nology-based standards and the “safety net” of the Residual Risk program).  See also infra notes 
168, 204 (discussing the Residual Risk program). 
 114. See 136 CONG. REC. 6465 (1990) (statement of Sen. Breaux) (“Rather than continuing 
to allow the current situation of endless debates over the health effects of exposure to particular 
pollutants before controls go into place, this legislation will ensure technology controls are ap-
plied to control these pollutants.”). 
 115. See Pub. L. No. 101-549 § 301, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
7412(b)) (listing 189 substances as hazardous air pollutants).  In 1996, EPA, acting under au-
thority of section 112(b)(3)(C), delisted one pollutant (caprolactam).  See Hazardous Air Pol-
lutant List; Modification, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,816 (June 18, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).  
In 2004, EPA also delisted ethylene glycol monobutyl ether, bringing the total to 187.  See List 
of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Petition Process, Lesser Quantity Designations, Source Category 
List; Petition To Delist of Ethylene Glycol Monobutyl Ether, 69 Fed. Reg. 69,320 (Nov. 29, 
2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
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facilities in the same industry would have to meet the so called 
“floor.”116  The floor for new “major” sources was set at the level of 
“emission control that is achieved in practice by the best controlled 
similar source,”117 and for existing “major” sources the floor repre-
sented the “average emission limitation achieved by the best perform-
ing 12 percent” of sources in the same industrial category.118  By man-
dating a floor, Congress eliminated any need for EPA to evaluate, at 
least at this stage of the regulatory process, the costs associated with 
any available pollution control technology or the risk reduction bene-
fits offered by that technology.  Nor would the Agency have to decide 
whether the costs were worth the benefits; the legislature had made 
that policy choice already. 
Congress, however, did not eliminate all policy choices for the 
Agency.  EPA still must decide if technology-based standards more 
stringent than the floors would be appropriate for regulated entities—
standards that have come to be known as the “maximum achievable 
control technology” or “MACT” standards.119  In particular, section 
112(d)(2) of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to determine the 
“maximum degree of reduction in emissions” that can be achieved us-
ing any available technologies, “taking into consideration the cost of 
achieving such emission reduction.”120  With that statutory mandate 
Congress established similar goals for the MACT program and for the 
Clean Water Act’s BAT program: to protect public health and the 
environment from the risks posed by hazardous air pollutants to the 
extent possible without imposing undue burdens on the nation’s 
 
 116. As the D.C. Circuit said in a related context, the “nomenclature can be confusing” be-
cause references to the floor actually “establish maximums on the emissions that EPA’s stan-
dards may permit.”  Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (reviewing technol-
ogy-based standard under section 129 of the Clean Air Act, which is very similar to section 112). 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3).  A source is “major” if it “emits, or has the potential to emit . . . 
10 tons per year or more of any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any com-
bination of hazardous air pollutants.”  Id. § 7412(a)(1). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See, e.g., Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(describing “MACT standards”).  Officially the MACT standards are listed in the Federal Regis-
ter as National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (“NESHAPs”), which is also 
the pre-1990 terminology for the “ample margin of safety” standards.  See, e.g., National Emis-
sion Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Primary Aluminum Reduction Plants, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 12,645 (proposed Mar. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2).  Congress also directed the Agency, as under the Clean Water 
Act, to consider two other factors that represent the “costs” of using a pollution control tech-
nology in the broader sense of the  word: “the non-air quality health and environmental im-
pacts” of the technology and its “energy requirements.”  Id. 
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economy.121  Thus, although the MACT standards rely on the “maxi-
mum achievable” technology, whereas the BAT standards require the 
“best available” technology, in both cases the Agency’s task is essen-
tially the same: to seek those risk reduction benefits from a candidate 
technology that, in the Agency’s policy judgment, justify the control 
costs.122 
B. EPA’s Method of Setting MACT Standards: Limited Compliance 
with the APA 
1. Transparent Consideration of Pollutant Quantities and Tox-
icities as Indicators of Risk Reduction Benefits in Some 
MACT Rulemakings 
Understanding the twin goals that Congress established for the 
MACT program, EPA correctly recognized early on that to choose 
whether to impose a standard more stringent than the floor it would 
have to consider not only the costs of a candidate technology, but also 
the risk reduction benefits it offered.  As the Agency stated in its first 
major MACT rule:  “As a matter of general policy in decisions to se-
lect control levels above the floor, EPA believes that the cost-
effectiveness of controls and a comparison of benefits, both quantifi-
able and nonquantifiable, and costs are primary considerations.”123  
Throughout the nearly 100 rulemakings in which EPA has adopted 
MACT standards for different industrial sectors, the Agency has re-
peatedly analyzed the risk reduction benefits of available technolo-
gies and rejected certain controls because the costs, compared to 
 
 121. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 168 (1989),  as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 
3553 (in setting the MACT standards, EPA should select a control “configuration or calibration 
which provides the greatest protection to human health ” and the “maximum protection of hu-
man health shall be the objective test” for EPA in selecting MACT standards); Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1989, 136 CONG. REC. S3748, 1990 CAA Leg. Hist. 6946, 7197 (Lexis) (state-
ment of Senator Domenici) (“[T]he basic concept of technology requirements is a necessary 
first step to assure the public that measures are being taken to address this serious public health 
threat.”) (emphasis added). 
 122. EPA, in fact, refers to its regulatory actions under the MACT program as “serv[ing] the 
risk reduction purposes of the [Clean Air] Act.”  National Emission Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants; Availability: Draft Schedule for the Promulgation of Emission Standards, 57 
Fed. Reg. 44,147, 44,149 (proposed Sept. 24, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 123. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories;  
Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Indus-
try and Seven Other Processes, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,608, 62,631 (proposed Dec. 31, 1992) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (emphasis added). 
022306 MCCUBBIN.DOC  3/13/2006  4:43 PM 
34 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 16.1 
those benefits, were in its judgment “unreasonable,”124 “excessive,”125 
or “disproportional.”126 
Periodically the Agency has explicitly characterized a control 
technology’s risk reduction benefits in terms of both the quantity of 
pollutant that would be reduced and its relative toxicity.  In one of its 
first regulations, for example, EPA expressly cited the relatively high 
toxicity of chromium to justify more stringent—and therefore more 
costly—regulation of large chromium electroplaters.127  Although the 
technology on which it planned to base the emission standards had 
“very high costs of control compared to the associated chromium 
emission reductions,” those high costs of control were “reasonable” 
according to the Agency when weighed against, among other things, 
the “high toxicity of chromium,” which was 1500 times more toxic 
than benzene.128 
 
 124. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Phosphoric Acid 
Manufacturing and Phosphate Fertilizers Production, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,358, 31,369 (June 10, 
1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63) (declining to impose stringent technology because 
“the costs would be unreasonable”); Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, 
and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category; National 
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp and Paper Produc-
tion, 58 Fed. Reg. 66,078, 66,141 (proposed Dec. 17, 1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 63 & 
430) (“The cost-effectiveness of [a particular technology] is thus unreasonable for the additional 
[hazardous air pollutant] emission reductions achieved, and EPA rejected this option from fur-
ther consideration.”); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Proposed 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions from Magnetic Tape Manufacturing Opera-
tions, 59 Fed. Reg. 11,662, 11,677 (proposed Mar. 11, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) 
(similar); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (Secondary Lead Smelt-
ers), 59 Fed. Reg. 29,750, 29,763 (proposed June 9, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) 
(similar); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Wet-Formed Fibe r-
glass Mat Production, 65 Fed. Reg. 34,278, 34,286 (proposed May 26, 2000) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 63) (similar). 
 125. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Catego-
ries; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Steel Pickling Facilities—
HCl Process, 62 Fed. Reg. 49,052, 49,062 (proposed Sept. 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 63). 
 126. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Oil and Natural 
Gas Production and Natural Gas Transmission and Storage, 63 Fed. Reg. 6288, 6306 (proposed 
Feb. 6, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 127. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Proposed Standards for 
Chromium Emissions from Hard and Decorative Chromium Electroplating and Chromium 
Anodizing Tanks, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,768, 65,790 (proposed Dec. 16, 1993) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 128. Id.  See also National Emission Standards for Chromium Emissions from Hard and 
Decorative Chromium Electroplating and Chromium Anodizing Tanks, 60 Fed. Reg. 4948, 4954 
(Jan. 25, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63) (“Although [the] costs may seem high, 
the EPA believes the toxicity of chromium justifies these costs.”). 
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The Agency also cited the high toxicities of cadmium and lead as 
justification for more stringent and costly regulation of cement kilns 
fueled with hazardous wastes.129  EPA stated in its proposed rule that 
the “primary factor” in its decision to impose a technology more 
stringent than the mandatory floor was “cost-effectiveness,” explain-
ing that if “the Agency’s economic analysis suggested that [beyond-
the-floor] levels could be cost-effectively achieved (particularly if sig-
nificant health benefits would result from a lower emission level), then 
an applicable [beyond-the-floor] emission level control technology 
was identified to achieve that level.”130  Consequently, in its final de-
termination, EPA indeed imposed a technology more stringent and 
costly than the floor because even though the cost-effectiveness was 
“relatively poor,” the reduced “lead and cadmium emissions . . . are 
particularly toxic.”131 
Similarly, EPA has relied on a pollutant’s toxicity, or rather the 
lack of it, to justify less stringent regulation, rejecting available but 
expensive technologies if their risk reduction benefits were judged to 
be relatively low compared to their costs.  For phosphoric acid manu-
facturers, for example, the Agency found the “estimated health risks” 
from hydrogen fluoride to be “minimal,” and concluded that “[n]one 
of the health impact analyses for existing sources indicated a need to 
control emissions beyond the levels corresponding to the MACT 
floors.”132  Likewise, in a proposed rule for endocrine disruptors emit-
ted by manufacturers of the active ingredients in pesticides, EPA in-
dicated “that the existing information on emissions and health ef-
fects” of those pollutants did not appear to “justify the additional cost 
of more stringent standards.”133 
 
 129. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Final Standards for Ha z-
ardous Air Pollutants for Hazardous Waste 
Combustors, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,828, 52,882 (Sept. 30, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63, 
260, 261, 264, 265, 266, 270 & 271). 
 130. Revised Standards for Hazardous Waste Combustors, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,358, 17,368 (pro-
posed Apr. 19, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63, 260, 261, 264, 265, 266, 270 & 271) 
(emphasis added). 
 131. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Final Standards for Ha z-
ardous Air Pollutants for Hazardous Waste 
Combustors, 64 Fed. Reg. at 52,882.  See infra  text accompanying notes 175-77 for a discussion 
of subsequent judicial challenges to this rule, including, perhaps, a challenge to these very toxic-
ity considerations. 
 132. National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants Phosphoric Acid 
Manufacturing and Phosphate Fertilizers Production, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,430, 68,437 (proposed 
Dec. 27, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 133. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Pesticide Active 
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To help determine how a pollutant’s toxicity should affect the 
Agency’s assessment of a technology’s risk reduction benefits, EPA 
also specifically solicited relevant comments from interested parties.  
For example, in the proposed rule just mentioned, the Agency re-
quested “comments on whether the risk posed by endocrine disrup-
tors warrants more stringent requirements,”134 and in its final rule, 
having received no comments urging tighter controls, EPA recon-
firmed its preliminary decision not to impose emission limits beyond 
the mandatory floor.135  Moreover, in a rule for cement kilns that 
burned nonhazardous wastes, the Agency proposed only the manda-
tory floor for emissions of dioxins and furans, but “solicit[ed] com-
ments on whether a [beyond-the-floor] standard would be appropri-
ate” for those pollutants because they “are some of the most toxic 
compounds known due to their bioaccumulation potential and wide 
range of health effects at exceedingly low doses, including carcino-
genesis.”136  The Agency also asked commenters whether stringent 
standards were warranted for emissions of mercury, another highly 
toxic pollutant, from those kilns.137  In the final rule, after receiving 
and evaluating comments both for and against more stringent limits, 
the Agency declined to set beyond-the-floor standards for those three 
pollutants.138 
In the selected rules discussed above, the Agency’s consideration 
of the technologies’ risk reduction benefits conformed to the letter 
and spirit of the APA.  Pursuant to the APA, to ensure EPA’s ac-
countability through transparent rulemaking, the Agency must ex-
plain the factors on which it bases a rule, and it must solicit and re-
spond meaningfully to public comments.139  EPA fulfilled those 
 
Ingredient Production, 62 Fed. Reg. 60,566, 60,569 (proposed Nov. 10, 1997) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 134. Id. 
 135. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Pesticide Active Ingredient 
Production, 64 Fed. Reg. 33,550, 33,586 (June 23, 1999) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63).  
 136. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Proposed Standards 
for Hazardous Air Pollutants Emissions for the Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry, 63 
Fed. Reg. 14,182, 14,201 (proposed Mar. 24, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 137. Id. at 14,202 (“Mercury is one of the more toxic metals known due to its bioaccumula-
tion potential and the adverse neurological health effects at low concentrations especially to the 
most sensitive populations at risk (i.e., unborn children, infants and young children).”). 
 138.  National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories; 
Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,898, 31,917 (June 14, 1999) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (for dioxins and furans); id. at 31,918 (for mercury). 
 139. See supra  text accompanying notes 77-80.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3)(A), (C) 
(2000) (procedures for rulemaking under the Clean Air Act requiring the Agency to include “a 
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obligations by (1) explaining in the Federal Register notices the toxici-
ties of the pollutants at issue and how the risks they posed affected 
the Agency’s choice of MACT standards for the industries under re-
view, and (2) seeking and responding to public comments on these is-
sues. 
2. In Most MACT Rulemakings, Hidden Use by the Agency of 
Widely Available Toxicity Data in Contravention of the 
APA 
The Agency’s openness in the above examples stands in sharp 
contrast to its approach for the majority of the MACT rules, in which 
it did not explicitly discuss pollutant toxicities as a factor in its deci-
sionmaking and yet almost certainly took them into account.  The 
Agency had at its disposal a wealth of information about the harms 
caused by the hazardous air pollutants regulated under the MACT 
program, and while Congress had directed EPA to gather much of 
that information for other purposes, it is difficult to believe that the 
Agency did not rely on the data at all when determining the risk re-
duction benefits of the technologies studied in all its MACT rules. 
Section 112(e)(2)(A) of the Clean Air Act, for instance, required 
EPA to consider “the known or anticipated adverse effects of such 
[hazardous air] pollutants” emitted by all the different regulated in-
dustries when deciding which industrial sectors should be given 
higher priority in the standard setting process.140  To implement that 
mandate EPA developed a “Source Category Ranking System” based 
primarily on two elements: (1) estimates of the quantity of emissions 
from an industry; and (2) estimates of the toxicity of its hazardous air 
pollutants.141  For the latter, EPA relied on toxicity information avail-
able from several databases that collect the results of laboratory ani-
mal studies or epidemiological analyses of workers or residents ex-
 
summary of the factual data on which the proposed rule is based . . . and the major legal inter-
pretations and policy considerations underlying the proposed rule”); id. § 7607(d)(6)(B) (requir-
ing EPA to respond “to each of the significant comments, criticisms, and new data submitted . . . 
during the comment period”). 
 140. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(2)(A). 
 141. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Availability: Dra ft Sche d-
ule for the Promulgation of Emission Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 44,147, 44,150-53 (proposed Sept. 
24, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (describing the “exposure score” and the “health 
effects score”); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Schedule for the 
Promulgation of Emission Standards Under Section 112(e) of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,941, 63,943 (Dec. 3, 1993) (final schedule). 
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posed to a pollutant.142  Data estimating reproductive toxicity, acute 
lethality and other noncarcinogenic adverse health effects, for in-
stance, are available from the Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical 
Substances, maintained by the National Institute of Occupational 
Safety and Health.143 
EPA used similar toxicity data to identify nearly 50 “high-risk 
pollutants” as part of the “early reductions” program under section 
112(i)(5)(E) of the Clean Air Act.144  That program allowed a facility 
to avoid MACT regulations for a certain number of years if it sub-
stantially reduced its emissions voluntarily by an early deadline, but 
facilities received less credit for reducing emissions of those high-risk 
pollutants.145  Not only did the Agency identify the high-risk pollut-
ants, but it also ranked their toxicities relative to each other, assigning 
numerical indicators that signified whether the pollutant posed a high, 
medium, or low risk.146 
Even more extensive risk information was gathered by EPA to 
implement two special statutory provisions that excused sources from 
the MACT standards under certain limited circumstances.  Under 
section 112(c)(9)(B) of the Clean Air Act, EPA could choose not to 
set MACT standards for an industry if, inter alia , its hazardous air 
pollutants did not “cause a lifetime risk of cancer greater than one in 
one million to the individual in the population who is most exposed to 
emissions” from that type of source.147  Likewise, under section 
 
 142. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Av ailability: Draft Sche d-
ule for the Promulgation of Emission Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. at 44,153. 
 143. Id.  While EPA insists that the prioritization does not indicate relative risk, id. at 
44,150, that is an overstatement; it would be more accurate to say tha t the prioritization does 
not indicate precisely  the relative risks of the pollutants, given the limited nature of the data that 
was used. 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(5)(E).  See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollut-
ants; Compliance Extensions for Early Reductions, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,970, 61,980-85 (Dec. 29, 
1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(5)(A), (E). 
 146. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Compliance Extensions for 
Early Reductions, 57 Fed. Reg. at 61,980 (a ssigning “weighting factor” of 10, 100, or 1000 to 
each “high risk” pollutant).  See also National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
for Source Categories: Proposed Regulations Governing Compliance Extensions for Early Re-
ductions of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 56 Fed. Reg. 27,338, 27,354-55 (proposed June 13, 1991) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (explaining the weighting factors in proposed early reduc-
tions rule).  
 147. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(i) (allowing an industry to be deleted from EPA’s list of 
regulated entities if it meets this test).  For sources emitting noncarcinogens, the Agency could 
delist an industry if, inter alia , its emissions do not “exceed a level which is adequate to protect 
public health with an ample margin of safety.”  Id. § 7412(c)(9)(B)(ii). 
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112(d)(4) it could set limits for an industry’s noncarcinogenic emis-
sions to levels below the “health thresholds” for those pollutants.148  
To implement both those provisions, EPA conducted quantitative 
risk assessments that gathered data on the toxicities of the pollutants 
under study and on many other variables.149  If, after conducting those 
analyses for a given industry, the Agency concluded that the exemp-
tions were not available, and MACT standards would be necessary, 
that risk information would have been available for EPA’s use in se-
lecting the “maximum achievable” technology for those sources. 
The Agency also had the need to use quantitative risk assess-
ments under section 112(c)(3) to regulate “area sources”—those fa-
cilities that emit less than 10 tons per year of any single hazardous air 
pollutant or 25 tons per year of a combination of those pollutants, 
making them the smaller industrial facilities under EPA’s authority.150  
They are distinguished from “major” sources, which are the large fa-
cilities exceeding those threshold emission levels, and an industry 
might be comprised of both sizes of sources.151  While the Agency 
generally had to set MACT standards for all major sources, it was re-
quired to regulate area sources only if it found that they presented “a 
threat of adverse effects to human health or the environment,” as de-
termined by quantitative risk assessments.152  That information—
 
 148. Id. § 7412(d)(4) (allowing EPA to set risk-based standards for pollutants “for which a 
health threshold has been established” if the standard achieves an “ample margin of safety”). 
 149. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Proposed Stan-
dards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Chemical Recovery Combustion Sources at Kraft, 
Soda, Sulfite, and Stand-Alone Semichemical Pulp Mills, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,745, 18,765-67 (pro-
posed Apr. 15, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (explaining how the Agency proposed 
to implement the authority of section 112(d)(4) for hydrochloric acid emissions from one pa r-
ticular industry); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Plywood and 
Composite Wood Products, 68 Fed. Reg. 1276, 1297 (proposed Jan. 9, 2003) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R pt. 63) (conducting “rough” risk assessment for plywood industry to delist a low-risk sub-
category pursuant to section 112(c)(9)(B)).  See also National Emission Standards for Hazard-
ous Air Pollutants for Source Categories: General Provisions, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,760, 42,771-72 
(proposed Aug. 11, 1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 61 & 63) (explaining process for 
delisting industries under section 112(c)(9)(B), including the use of risk assessments). 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(3); id. § 7412(a)(2) (defining “area” source as not a “major” 
source); id. § 7412(a)(1) (defining “major” source). 
 151. Id. § 7412(a)(1) (defining “major” source).  See Initial List of Categories of Sources 
Under Section 112(c)(1) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,576, 31,586 
(July 16, 1992) (describing industrial categories as containing both area and major sources). 
 152. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(3); Initial List of Categories of Sources Under Section 112(c)(1) 
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed. Reg. at 31,587 (“In the findings accompany-
ing the area source listings in today’s notice, quantitative assessments of risk are an important 
consideration . . . .”).  EPA initially chose to list and regulate five area source categories.  Id. at 
31,586.  Then, as it proceeded to consider MACT standards for various major source categories, 
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while perhaps technically related solely to the area sources within an 
industrial category—would no doubt have been available for EPA’s 
selection of the MACT standards for the major sources within the 
same category. 
It is certainly reasonable to conclude that the Agency would have 
used this extensive information about the hazardous air pollutants’ 
adverse health effects to inform its assessment of the risk reduction 
benefits available through regulation, especially when EPA had can-
didly acknowledged in some of its earliest MACT rules (and later 
ones as well) that a pollutant’s relative toxicity influenced the 
Agency’s choice of the “maximum achievable” technology for an in-
dustry.153  Weighing a pollutant’s toxicity in the MACT program also 
would have been consistent with the Agency’s approach under the 
similarly structured BAT program of the Clean Water Act, where it 
tailored the standard setting process to demand more stringent (and 
 
it decided now and then to add other area source categories to the list of regulated entities.  See, 
e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Secondary Lead Smelting, 
60 Fed. Reg. 32,587, 32,592 (June 23, 1995) (regulating area sources engaged in secondary lead 
smelting). 
 153. See supra  text accompanying notes 123-38.  That EPA was likely considering the toxici-
ties of the pollutants emitted by regulated entities when determining whether to impose be-
yond-the-floor MACT standards is also suggested by the controversial proposals in some of the 
most recent MACT standards to exempt individual “low-risk” facilities.  See EPA Approves 
Brick, Clay Emission Limits Without Exemption for Low-Risk Facilities, 34 ENV’T REP. 518 
(BNA) (Mar. 7, 2003) (summarizing proposals for the brick and structural clay industry and for 
five other industrial categories).  The proposals were fiercely criticized as contrary to the 
Agency’s statutory authority.  Id.  EPA subsequently finalized the MACT standards for the 
brick and structural clay industry without including the exemption for low-risk facilities.  Na-
tional Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Brick and Structural Clay Products 
Manufacturing; and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Clay Cera m-
ics Manufacturing, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,690, 26,694-96 (May 16, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
63).  However, it published a final rule for industrial boilers, exempting low-risk facilities, that 
has been challenged by environmental organizations.  National Emission Standards for Hazard-
ous Air Pollutants for Industrial, Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 69 
Fed. Reg. 55,218 (Sept. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).  See Coalition’s Lawsuit 
Charges EPA Too Lax on Toxic Standards for Industrial Boilers, 35 ENV’T REP. 2384 (BNA) 
(Nov. 19, 2004).  EPA also published a final rule for plywood manufacturers that delists a low-
risk subcategory of that industry pursuant to section 112(c)(9)(B) of the Clean Air Act.  Na-
tional Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Plywood and Composite Wood Prod-
ucts; Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Timber Products Point Source 
Category; List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Lesser Quantity Designations, Source Category 
List, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,944, 45,984 (July 30, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 63 & 429).  See 
supra text accompanying note 153 (discussing that delisting authority).  That rule also has been 
challenged by environmental groups.  See EPA Sued Over Risk-Based Exemption in Air Toxics 
Emissions Limits for Plywood, 35 ENV’T REP. 2048 (BNA) (Oct. 1, 2004).  
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more costly) technology for the more serious harms and less stringent 
technology (at less cost) for the less serious harms.154 
The conclusion that this risk information was informing EPA’s 
MACT decisions is further supported by a handful of statements in 
the Federal Register in which EPA admitted that it considered the 
harms caused by the pollutants at issue when selecting MACT stan-
dards.155  Those statements arose not in the context of EPA explain-
ing the bases for its MACT decisions, but rather in the Agency’s dis-
cussions of its compliance with the administrative requirements 
imposed by Executive Order 13045.156  That Executive Order, 
adopted in April 1997, required EPA to analyze the “environmental 
health or safety effects” of any “economically significant” rule that 
“concern[s] an environmental health risk or safety risk that . . . may 
disproportionately affect children.”157  Initially, after the Executive 
Order was issued, EPA simply asserted that the Order was inapplica-
ble because the MACT program is not based “on health or safety 
risks,” mimicking the Order’s language.158  Later, however, in seven 
Federal Register notices scattered throughout the years between 1999 
and 2002, EPA explained that while the floor was set without regard 
to risk, “a decision to increase the stringency beyond this floor can be 
partly based on risk considerations,”159 and “the Agency may consider 
the inherent toxicity  of a regulated pollutant.”160 
 
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 65-76. 
 155. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Cate-
gory: Pulp and Paper Production, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,555, 17,562 (Apr. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 156. Exec. Order No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (Apr. 23, 1997). 
 157.  Id. at 19,887 (§ 5-501) (applying to any “covered regulatory action”); id. at 19,885 (§ 2-
202) (defining a “covered regulatory action”).  An “economically significant” rule is, inter alia , 
one “that has an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.”  Id. (§ 2-202(a)). 
 158. See, e.g., Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for 
Synthetic-Based and Other Non-Aqueous Drilling Fluids in the Oil and Gas Extraction Point 
Source Category, 64 Fed. Reg. 5488, 5529 (proposed Feb. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 435) (claiming that the program is merely technology-based, as if that answers the question 
of whether health risks are considered at all). 
 159. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category: 
Pulp and Paper Production, 64 Fed. Reg. at 17,562; National Emission Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants for Polyether Polyols Production, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,420, 29,437 (June 1, 1999) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production, 65 Fed. Reg. 3907, 3920 (proposed Jan. 25, 2000) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63); National Emission Standards for Ha zardous Air Pollutants: 
Group I Polymers and Resins; Group IV Polymers and Resins, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,030, 38,035 
(June 19, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63); National Emission Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants for Polyether Polyols Production; Sy nthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing 
Industry; Epoxy Resins Production and Non-Nylon Polyamides Production; and Petroleum Re-
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Because this evidence strongly suggests that EPA considered the 
toxicities of the relevant pollutants in all its MACT rulemakings, it is 
then also reasonable to conclude that the Agency has violated the 
APA by failing to reveal those considerations to the public.  While 
the APA requires an agency to explain all the factual and policy bases 
for its rules,161 in the bulk of its MACT rules EPA described the risk 
reduction benefits of the control technologies only in terms of the 
quantity of pollutants that could be reduced without explaining how 
the particular health and environmental hazards caused by the pollut-
ants informed its decisionmaking.162  In most rules, the Agency was 
simply silent on that issue.  It is unclear why EPA chose not to dis-
close that important aspect of its decisionmaking, although one can 
surmise that it would generally be easier for the Agency to have one 
less factor to explain in the Federal Register.  Whatever the reason, 
the Agency’s failure to reveal the pollutants’ relative toxicities as an 
element of its MACT decisions conflicted with the basic requirements 
of the APA. 
Moreover, EPA has managed to divert public attention away 
from its sub silentio risk considerations by incorrectly suggesting that 
pollutant toxicities were entirely irrelevant to the MACT program 
 
fineries, 65 Fed. Reg. 26,491, 26,496 (May 8, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63).  See 
also Standards of Performance for Bulk Gasoline Terminals and National Emission Standards 
for Gasoline Distribution Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 59,434, 59,440 (proposed Sept. 20, 2002) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63) (The decision to go beyond the floor “can be partly based on 
risk-type considerations, although EPA does not conduct true risk assessments when deciding to 
regulate beyond the MACT floor under section 112(d)(2).”) (e mphasis added). 
 160. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Pesticide Active 
Ingredient Production, 64 Fed. Reg. 33,550, 33,588 (June 23, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 9 & 63) (emphasis added). What is particularly curious about those seven rules is that al-
most all of them were merely technical amendments to MACT standards adopted in earlier 
years and involve no decisions on whether to impose a beyond-the-floor limit. 
 161. See supra  text accompanying note 79.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2000) (establishing 
procedures for rulemaking under the Clean Air Act similar to the APA). 
 162. To be sure, in the opening of most of its MACT preambles, the Agency briefly de-
scribed the anticipated adverse health effects of exposure to the pollutants released by the  in-
dustry under review.  As just one example, in a 1996 proposed rule, EPA described the effects 
of methylene chloride, which causes short-term effects including reversible “nervous system 
symptoms such as decreased visual and auditory functions” and long -term effects in “the liver, 
kidney and cardiovascular system[s]” of laboratory animals.  See National Emission Standards 
for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Flexible Polyurethane Foam Production, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,406, 
68,407-08 (proposed Dec. 27, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (also emphasizing that 
the agency has not conducted a “detailed and intensive risk assessment of [the] potential 
[health] effects”).  But what the Agency did not do is explain anywhere in the rulemakings ex-
actly how that toxicity information affected the Agency’s judgment as to which candidate tech-
nology’s costs were warranted. 
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because a MACT “standard is not based on health risk,”163 and “we 
do not consider health risks in determining MACT.”164  Those claims 
were plainly inconsistent with the Agency’s inherent need to consider 
risk reduction benefits to select technology-based standards and with 
EPA’s own admissions in other MACT rules that it was considering 
the benefits generally and the relative toxicities of the pollutants, in 
particular, as part of the measure of those benefits.165  Unfortunately, 
judges have tacitly approved EPA’s mischaracterizations by repeat-
edly describing a dichotomy between the technology-based MACT 
program, on the one hand, and the health-based or—in the words of 
the courts—“risk-based” programs of the Clean Air Act, on the 
other, from which they have inferred that information about health 
and environmental risks (including the toxic characteristics of the pol-
 
 163. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories; 
Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,898, 31,919 (June 14, 1999) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (rejecting suggestion by commenter that EPA should restrict hy-
drogen chloride emissions from cement plants because they posed a threat to public health).  
What is particularly frustrating about that statement is that it came in the same rulemaking 
where EPA had earlier solicited comments on whether a stringent standard should be set for 
dioxins, furans, and mercury because they were extremely toxic.  See supra  text accompanying 
notes 136-37.  Interestingly, the Sierra Club challenged this rulemaking, but did not raise the 
problem of EPA’s inconsistent statements.  Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
EPA took similarly inconsistent positions in the MACT standards for electroplaters.  The 
Agency just ified stringent standards for large electroplaters in part because of the “high toxicity 
of chromium.”  See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.  For small electroplaters, however, 
the Agency rejected a commenter’s suggestion that tighter emission limits were required to ad-
dress the risks posed by the pollutants at issue.  National Emission Standards for Chromium 
Emissions from Hard and Decorative Chromium Electroplating and Chromium Anodizing 
Tanks, 60 Fed. Reg. 4948, 4954 (Jan. 25, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 63).  It 
claimed that it was “premature” to be considering risks because a future program, the Residual 
Risk program, would address them.  Id. 
 164. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Generic Maximum 
Achievable Control Technology (Generic MACT), 64 Fed. Reg. 34,854, 34,859-60 (June 29, 
1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (responding to public comment suggesting that, to set a 
MACT limit, EPA had to do a “cost-benefit evaluation . . . of the incremental costs and benefits 
of additional controls as compared to the MACT floor,” and that the evaluation should reflect 
the potential “health benefits” of regulation).  If EPA was trying to suggest that it does not con-
sider the precise health risks posed by a regulated entity, then perhaps its statement was accu-
rate, but as written, it was overbroad as compared, say, to the Agency’s admissions in other con-
texts that the agency considers risk, just not risk established through full, quantitative risk 
assessments.  Cf. Standards of Performance for Bulk Gasoline Terminals and National Emission 
Standards for Gasoline Distribution Facilities (Bulk Gasoline Terminals and Pipeline Breakout 
Stations), 67 Fed. Reg. 59,434, 59,440 (proposed Sept. 20, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
60 & 63 (The decision to go beyond the floor “can be partly based on risk-type considerations, 
although EPA does not conduct true risk assessments when deciding to regulate beyond the 
MACT floor under section 112(d)(2).”) (emphasis added).  
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 123-38. 
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lutants) has no bearing whatsoever on the MACT standards.166  That 
dichotomy is false. 
C. The False Dichotomy and the Failure of Courts to Recognize 
EPA’s Inherent Need to Consider Risk Reduction Benefits in the 
MACT Program 
The courts supposedly have found that dichotomy when they 
compare the MACT program to two other statutory schemes that also 
have regulated or will soon regulate hazardous air pollutants.  The 
first is the pre-1990 Clean Air Act regime that required EPA to set 
emission standards that provided an “ample margin of safety to pro-
tect the public health.”167  The second is the “Residual Risk” pro-
gram, adopted by Congress in 1990 as a supplement to the MACT 
program, which directs EPA to set standards that provide (in lan-
guage identical to the pre-1990 program) an “ample margin of safety” 
to protect the public health from the emissions remaining after indus-
trial sources comply with the MACT standards.168 
Clearly those two health-based programs differ in a key respect 
from the technology-based MACT standards: to specify an “ample 
margin of safety” to protect the public health EPA conducts quantita-
tive risk assessments that rely not only on careful estimations of the 
toxic effects of pollutants, but also on analyses of population charac-
teristics, exposure routes, and other factors in an attempt to calculate 
precisely the harms from an industry to nearby residents.169  To select 
the “maximum achievable” technology for an industry, by contrast, 
EPA does not have to refer to such detailed risk assessments.170  Nev-
ertheless, when selecting the “maximum achievable” technologies 
under the Clean Air Act, just as when selecting the “best available” 
technologies under the Clean Water Act, EPA must have some gen-
eral sense of the ability of technologies to reduce public health and 
environmental risks; otherwise, it would have no way of knowing 
 
 166. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Cement Kiln Recy-
cling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 217 F.3d 861, 
862 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 167. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988) (amended 1990).  
 168. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2000) (requiring “ample margin of safety” standards to be 
adopted within eight years of the first round of MACT standards). 
 169. See supra text accompanying note 111. 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14. 
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which ones are the “maximum achievable” for the industries under 
review.171 
The distinction, then, between the programs that demand an 
“ample margin of safety” to protect public health, on the one hand, 
and the MACT program, on the other, is not whether EPA considers 
the public health and environmental risks from regulated entities at 
all, but how it considers that factor.  The health-based programs rely 
on precise, quantitative assessments of those risks.  The technology-
based MACT standards, on the other hand, only need to use impre-
cise measures of the risks and the corresponding risk reduction bene-
fits, as indicated by nothing more than the quantity of pollutant that 
could be eliminated and its relative toxicity.172 
Courts, however, have routinely described the MACT program 
as distinct from the “risk-based” or “health-based” programs,173 sug-
gesting they would agree with EPA’s claims that it does not consider 
risk reduction benefits, including pollutant toxicities, in its MACT 
rulemakings.174  In fact, two decisions by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, though not directly on 
point, have strongly implied that the Agency may not legally consider 
those factors.  In Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition (“CKRC”) v. EPA, 
the D.C. Circuit heard challenges to the MACT standards for cement 
kilns, which happened to be one of the few rules where EPA ex-
pressly indicated that the toxic effects of the pollutants justified a par-
ticularly stringent technology.175  Although the court did not directly 
 
 171. See supra  text accompanying notes 54-56.  Cf. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 217 F.3d at 866 (not-
ing that “the Clean Air Act’s purpose is to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air 
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare,” citing 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1), and 
chastising EPA for failing to make any findings that a particular rule would provide any public 
health or environmental benefits). 
 172. While EPA would only need to use very simple risk information to select the “maxi-
mum achievable” technology, the Agency, in fact, had the opportunity to use more specific risk 
information, as noted earlier, because it was also conducting fairly detailed risk assessments to 
implement the “area source” standards and other provisions of section 112.  See supra  text ac-
companying notes 147-52. 
 173. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 217 F.3d at 862 (explaining that the MACT program foregoes a 
“risk-based approach”); Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 857 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (describing the MACT program as separate from the “risk-based” program in place prior 
to 1990); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting Congress’ dis-
satisfaction with the pre -1990 “health-based regulation” and its decision to replace that scheme 
with a technology-based program). 
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 163-64. 
 175. 255 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  As noted earlier, EPA had decided to impose a stringent 
technology beyond-the-floor, because, even though the cost-effectiveness was “relatively poor,” 
“the reduced lead and cadmium emissions . . . are particularly toxic.”  National Emission Stan-
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rule on the legality of that justification, it found (for other reasons) 
that the standards were improper and explained that it would vacate 
them, rather than simply remanding to the Agency, because “EPA 
may have exceeded its statutory mandate by relying on policy objec-
tives other than those enumerated in section 7412(d).”176  What the 
court viewed as the improper “policy objectives” is unclear,177 but the 
judges may very well have been signaling their (inaccurate) view that 
EPA did not have authority to weigh a pollutant’s toxicity in the 
MACT standard setting process. 
In the second noteworthy case, Sierra Club v. EPA, the environ-
mental challengers argued that the MACT standards for primary 
copper smelters were not stringent enough because copper in the at-
mosphere eventually settles into waterways and onto land, where it 
can cause various adverse effects.178  They claimed that section 
112(d)(2) of the Clean Air Act, which directs the Agency to take into 
consideration the “non-air quality health and environmental im-
pact[s]” of a control technology when selecting a MACT standard, 
required EPA to take into account those non-air impacts of the haz-
ardous air pollutants emitted by the smelters.179  The court disagreed, 
finding that the provision compelled the Agency only to consider the 
impacts to lands and waters where the waste byproducts generated 
from air pollution control devices are disposed, not where the haz-
ardous air pollutants themselves deposit.180  Although technically the 
 
dards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Final Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Hazard-
ous Waste Combustors, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,828, 52,882 (Sept. 30, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 60, 63, 260, 261, 264, 265, 266, 270 & 271).  See supra text accompanying notes 129-31. 
 176. Cement Kiln Recycling Coal., 255 F.3d at 872. 
 177. Whether the consideration of the high toxicity of the pollutants was the improper “pol-
icy objective” is unclear because EPA had also taken the position in the rulemaking that a be-
yond-the-floor standard would create a “strong incentive for waste minimization of lead and 
cadmium sent for combustion,” would “support[] our Children’s Health Initiative,” and would 
be consistent with European Union standards—all of which arguably are outside the scope of 
the factors Congress expected the Agency to consider when setting MACT standards.  National 
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Final Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
for Hazardous Waste Combustors, 64 Fed. Reg. at 52,882. 
 178. 353 F.3d 976, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 179. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (2000)). 
 180. Id.  That ruling is correct.  The reference to “non-air quality health and environmental 
impacts” first appeared in the Clean Air Act in 1977 in the provision directing EPA to set New 
Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”), which are another set of technology-based standards 
similar to the MACT standards.  Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 109(a), 91 Stat. 698 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(g)(4)(B)).  The NSPS provision originally required the Agency to find the 
“best” technology considering only costs, but in 1977 Congress expanded the list of factors to 
include non-air quality impacts and energy demands to affirm two opinions issued by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Portland Cement Ass’n v. Rucke l-
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case did not address whether, in a MACT rule, EPA can take note of 
an air pollutant’s toxic effects directly in the atmosphere, the court 
used sweeping language that at least suggests the Agency has no au-
thority to do so, writing that MACT standards should not reflect “an 
assessment of the risks posed by” the hazardous air pollutants and 
sources under review181 and that the “technology-based/risk-based 
distinction” is “at the heart of the Act.”182 
As support for that distinction, the Sierra Club court quoted 
from a Senate report accompanying the 1990 Amendments to the 
Clean Air Act that described the MACT standards as “based on the 
performance of technology, and not on the health and environmental 
effects of hazardous air pollutants.”183  That is an overstatement.  The 
 
shaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973).  Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 109(a), 91 Stat. 698 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
7411(g)(4)(B)).  Those cases dealt with the question of whether, under the NSPS provision, 
EPA could decline to declare a technology “best” if it would significantly reduce air pollution 
but would create substantial amounts of waste byproducts that would have to be disposed of in 
landfills or in waterways.  See, e.g., Essex Chem., 486 F.2d at 439 (discussing how potential use of 
“sodium sulfite-bisulfite scrubbers” would lead to “significant land or water pollution” resulting 
from disposal of byproducts).  Both courts concluded that Congress must have meant the 
Agency to consider such “counter-productive environmental effects of a proposed standard” 
because otherwise, in the words of one court, the term “‘best’ could apply to a system which did 
more damage to water than it prevented to air.”  Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 385, n.42; Essex 
Chem., 486 F.2d at 439.  As a committee of the United States House of Representatives wrote in 
a 1977 report accompanying the proposed amendments to the Clean Air Act, the courts’ inter-
pretations were “implicit in the previous [statutory] language” but the NSPS provision needed 
to be amended so as to expressly direct EPA to take account of non-air quality impacts to make 
clear that “the term ‘best system’ necessarily involves consideration of factors such as water and 
land impacts of the system.”  COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, CLEAN AIR 
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977: REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN 
COMMERCE TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 6161 TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL, SEPARATE, AND 
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS, H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 190 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1077, 1269. 
 181. Sierra Club, 353 F.3d at 980. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.  (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 148 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 
3533).  The legislative history includes several other similar statements that suggest that risk is 
irrelevant to the MACT program.  For instance, Senator Steven D. Symms (R -Idaho) stated 
that the MACT standards are to be determined “regardless of whether the hypothetical risk is 
large, small or neglig ible.” 136 CONG. REC. 36,016 (1990).  Likewise, Representative William 
Dannemeyer (R-Calif.) stated: “The legislation requires EPA to establish [MACT] emission 
standards for cancer-causing chemicals without regard to toxicity or human exposure.” 136 
CONG. REC. 35,054 (1990). 
Those statements, however, were offered to criticize the MACT standards’ failure to con-
sider the risk posed by individual members of an industrial sector, without speaking to whether 
risk at all—even on a category-wide basis—would be considered in the MACT standards.  The 
House had passed a bill that would have offered any individual member of a regulated industrial 
category an exemption from the MACT standards if it could show, through a site-specific quanti-
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pollutants’ effects would be completely irrelevant only if Congress 
had directed EPA to set all MACT standards at nothing more than 
the congressionally imposed floor, which requires, inter alia , all exist-
ing facilities in the same industrial category to meet the average emis-
sion limit achieved by the top 12% of the industry.184  To set that 
floor, the Agency would not have to evaluate the risks from the pol-
lutants and sources under study (or, for that matter, the costs of re-
ducing those risks), and that Senate statement may very well have 
been trying to highlight the special nature of the floor.  But once 
Congress asked EPA to decide whether to impose MACT standards 
more stringent than the floor, then the Agency must have some gen-
eral notion, however vague, of the adverse health and environmental 
harms caused by the regulated entities and the corresponding risk re-
duction benefits of pollution controls.185 
In short, courts wrongly see a fundamental dichotomy between 
the health-based or risk-based programs of the Clean Air Act and the 
MACT program, incorrectly believing that considerations of risk are 
entirely irrelevant to the latter.  That judicial mischaracterization par-
allels—and, indeed, facilitates—EPA’s own false claims that its 
MACT rules do not take into account pollutant toxicities when esti-
mating the benefits of regulation. 
 
tative risk assessment, that it posed no more than a certain specified level of risk to human 
health.  H.R. 3030, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990) (adding section 112(g), which allowed a source 
an “alternative emission limitation” if it could show, for carcinogens, that it poses no more than 
a one in one million risk of cancer to the “actual person who is most exposed to [its hazardous 
air pollutant] emissions” and, for noncarcinogens, show that its emissions “do not exceed a level 
which is adequate to protect public health with an ample margin of safety”).  The Senate bill 
had no such site-specific exemption for low-risk facilities.  In the final bill agreed to by both 
chambers, the House agreed to drop that provision.  Instead, the law generally required all 
members of the same industrial category to be subject to the same MACT standard.  See 136 
CONG. REC. 36,060 (1990) (statement of Sen. Durenberger) (“the House receded to the Senate 
on this point [and t]he provision was deleted in conference”). 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)). 
 185. See supra  text accompanying notes 119-22.  Thus, the more accurate legislative state-
ment came from Representative James R. Rowland, Jr., who stated that Congress had “made 
risk assessment largely  irrelevant” to the MACT standard setting process, suggesting quite ap-
propriately that risk itself—as opposed to the more precise calculations of a risk assessment—
was not entirely  irrelevant to the MACT program.  See 136 CONG. REC. 35,379 (1990) (emphasis 
added). 
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IV.  THE NEED FOR STATUTORY AMENDMENTS TO PREVENT EPA 
FROM THWARTING THE APA WHEN IT ADOPTS TECHNOLOGY-
BASED STANDARDS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT 
A significant problem has developed with the technology-based 
standards adopted under both the Clean Water Act and the Clean 
Air Act:  Aided by incorrect judicial rulings, EPA has been able to 
thwart APA review of its assessments of the risk reduction benefits 
offered by candidate technologies—an inherent factor in the 
Agency’s selection of the “best available” or “maximum achievable” 
pollution control technology for a given industry.  The APA antici-
pates that, to prevent an agency from abusing its discretion, the 
agency must explain the factual and policy bases for its rules, take and 
respond to public comments on its proposed rules, and face judicial 
scrutiny of its decisions.186  Yet under the Clean Water Act, EPA was 
able to shield its calculations of the risk reduction benefits from judi-
cial review, successfully convincing  the courts that any discussion of 
those benefits in the Federal Register preambles for the various BAT 
standards was irrelevant to the selection of the “best available” tech-
nology.187  Under the Clean Air Act, the Agency not only avoided ju-
dicial review of its MACT benefits calculations, but also withheld that 
information from the public.188 
In theory, judges themselves could reverse this trend by recogniz-
ing that, even though the ambiguous statutory provisions of the Clean 
Water Act and the Clean Air Act might suggest otherwise, EPA can-
not logically select the “best available” or “maximum achievable” 
technology for an industry without knowing the benefits of candidate 
controls, and the Agency’s assessment of those benefits necessarily 
depends on a technology’s ability to reduce risks to public health and 
the environment.189  In particular, courts would have to understand 
 
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82. 
 187. See supra text accompanying notes 84-106. 
 188. See supra  text accompanying notes 140-85.  See also DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-
PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 74, 
82-83 (1999) [hereinafter ECO-PRAGMATISM] (discussing “feasibility” analysis, another way of 
describing the process of selecting technology-based standards, as having the “result . . . that 
costs and benefits are really being compared, though only covertly” and how the “bala ncing” 
between benefits and costs “is forced unde rground, rather than being explicit”). 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49, 54-56, and 170-71. See also SIDNEY A. 
SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH 32, 37-38 (2003) [hereinafter RISK REGULATION AT RISK] (describing technology-
based standards as based on a “constrained balancing” of costs and benefits); Ackerman & 
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that although Congress only expressly lists costs as the factor by 
which the Agency should identify the “best available” or “maximum 
achievable” technologies, a strict application of that statutory lan-
guage is inappropriate because it would always compel EPA not to 
choose any controls for an industry, since that would be the least 
costly option, thereby defeating Congress’ primary goal for the tech-
nology-based programs—to protect public health and the environ-
ment.190  Instead, a consideration of risk reduction benefits is neces-
sarily implied under the statutes so that the Agency can choose the 
technologies that minimize public health and environmental risks to 
the extent possible without imposing costs on industrial sources that 
EPA deems, as a matter of policy, excessive.191 
Courts would also have to reevaluate the legislative histories of 
the technology-based standards and adopt the better interpretations 
of certain equivocal congressional statements.  The 1990 Senate Re-
port about the Clean Air Act amendments should be understood to 
mean that information about the risks from regulated facilities is ir-
relevant only to the Agency’s determination of the MACT floor, not 
the beyond-the-floor standards.192  In addition, when Senator Muskie 
observed in 1972 that under the Clean Water Act EPA need not use a 
“balancing test” or perform a “cost-benefit analysis” to set BAT 
standards, he most likely meant that the Agency does not have to find 
as close a fit between the costs and benefits of a technology to declare 
it the “best” under the BAT program as it does for the less stringent 
BPT technology-based standards.193 
Most judges, however, are unlikely to take such steps after dec-
ades of contrary rulings by other courts that, unfortunately, adopted 
mischaracterizations of the Clean Water Act’s and Clean Air Act’s 
technology-based standards.  The petitioners in Texas Oil & Gas, in 
fact, urged that court to rethink the long-standing interpretations of 
the BAT provision, but the Fifth Circuit expressly declined to do so in 
light of “years of precedent.”194 
 
Stewart, supra note 23, at 1359 n.60 (“The vice of the BAT strategy is that it ignores this inevi-
table cost-benefit consideration, or at best buries it, by treating it as an engineering decision 
about technological feasibility.”). 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56, 170-71. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85. 
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
 194. Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 936 n.9 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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Because the entrenched judicial misconceptions of technology-
based standards ultimately stem from the confusing language and his-
tories of the two statutes, amending the BAT and MACT statutory 
provisions is the only way to correct those misconceptions by clarify-
ing what currently is implicit in the statutes:  Determining the “best 
available” or “maximum achievable” technology requires an evalua-
tion of the risk reduction benefits in some fashion.  Thus, section 
304(b)(2)(B) of the Clean Water Act and section 112(d)(2) of the 
Clean Air Act should be revised to expressly require EPA, when se-
lecting the “best available” or “maximum achievable” technology, not 
only to weigh the costs of implementing candidate technologies but 
also the benefits of reduced risks to public health and the environ-
ment offered by them.195  The Agency would then be required in 
every BAT or MACT rulemaking, consistent with the APA’s demand 
for transparency, to explain the possible risk reduction benefits from 
the technologies it studied, and to explain how those benefits affected 
its choice of “best available” or “maximum achievable” technology 
for a certain industry.  EPA would also have to solicit and respond to 
public comments on those issues.  Finally, judges who mistakenly be-
lieve that risk reduction benefits do not relate to the selection of 
technology-based standards and, as a result, fail to review them or 
force the Agency to reveal them would now be required to apply the 
procedural and substantive requirements of the APA to EPA’s esti-
mations of those risk reduction benefits, thereby ensuring the over-
sight necessary to maintain the Agency’s accountability. 
Critics of this proposal might argue that by adding risk reduction 
benefits as a new factor in the selection of technology-based stan-
dards, the proposed statutory amendments will require EPA to spend 
 
 195. By “costs,” I mean both the economic costs and the non-economic detriments previ-
ously listed by Congress, namely, the environmental impacts of using a pollution control tech-
nology (such as the solid wastes caused by emission controls) and the energy demands.  Cf. 33 
U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (2000). 
This is not to suggest that the weighing can or must occur through the formalized notion of 
a “cost-benefit” analysis, in which all positive and negative effects of a regulation are given 
monetary value.  Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2002).  Formal cost -benefit 
analysis does not make the task of choosing emission standards any more objective or scientific; 
it simply shifts the value -laden policy choices to the initial attempt to assign monetary values to 
the effects of the standards.  Id. at 1576-77.  See also Environmental Strategies, supra note 2, at 
180-91 (summarizing criticisms of demands that the costs of regulations be balanced against 
their benefits).  But see Colloquy, Cost-Benefit Analysis Colloquy: Squaring the Vicious Circle, 
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 257-314 (2001) (articles by an influential jurist and three leading scholars 
defending cost -benefit analysis in one form or another on various grounds). 
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an inordinate amount of time and resources trying to determine the 
risks from industrial sources and defending its assessments of those 
risks in court.  After all, the Agency’s earlier attempts to calculate 
those risks under the health-based programs of the Clean Water Act 
and the Clean Air Act resulted in “paralysis by analysis.”196  Similarly, 
according to this argument, the new statutory provisions would para-
lyze EPA’s BAT and MACT technology-based programs. 
A consideration of the risks posed by regulated entities, how-
ever, simply cannot be avoided in a technology-based regulatory re-
gime.  What can be avoided under this proposal are the two impedi-
ments that substantially delayed EPA’s implementation of the earlier 
health-based programs.  First, by failing to limit the type of data the 
Agency would have to use to identify the harmful air and water pol-
lutants and to set “ample margin of safety” standards under the two 
statutes, Congress left open the possibility that EPA needed to con-
duct extensive studies before acting.197  Second, many courts, when 
reviewing rules adopted by EPA and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (“OSHA”) under various statutory schemes, 
compelled the agencies to fully and precisely  assess the risks to be 
regulated.198  As Professor Thomas McGarity and others have docu-
 
 196. References to “paralysis by analysis” are replete in the legal and scientific literature 
about risk.  See, e.g., Douglas J. Crawford-Brown & Kenneth G. Brown, A Framework for As-
sessing the Rationa lity of Judgments in Carcinogenicity Hazard Identification, 8 RISK: HEALTH, 
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT 307, 313 (1997); Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future 
of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 415 (2004); 
Dwyer, supra  note 110, at 258; Kuehn, supra  note 111, at 148; Thomas O. McGarity, The Ex-
panded Debate Over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1523 (1996); 
Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty -First Century , 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 447 
(2003). 
The “ample margin of safety” standards EPA was required to adopt under the Clean Water 
Act and the Clean Air Act suffered from such “paralysis by analysis.”  As noted earlier, in five 
years EPA only proposed nine “ample margin of safety” standards for toxic water pollutants 
and finalized none.  Latin, supra  note 34, at 1307-09 (discussing EPA’s proposed nine rules).  
And in twenty years under the Clean Air Act, the Agency only identified eight hazardous air 
pollutants and adopted “ample margin of safety” standards for a small fraction of the industries 
emitting those pollutants.  See generally CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1989: REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS U.S. SENATE TOGETHER WITH 
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS, S. REP. 101-228, at 131 (1989),  as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3516 (referencing EPA’s delays). 
 197. See, e.g., Graham, supra  note 75, at 117 (Because the Clean Air Act “and its legislative 
history provide no guidance concerning what types of scientific data are required to support a 
decision to list” an air pollutant as “hazardous,” and because of the “regulatory implications of 
the listing decision,” EPA created “a time -consuming and cumbersome process for making the 
initial decision.”). 
 198. See Deossifying Rulemaking, supra note 79, at 1402-03.  See also RISK REGULATION AT 
RISK, supra note 189, at 193-96; JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE 
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mented, cases such as the now-famous Benzene decision199 and Corro-
sion Proof Fittings200—by which courts gave this “hard look” to 
OSHA and EPA risk regulations—forced the agencies thereafter to 
“prepare for the worst-case scenario on judicial review.”201  To re-
spond both to the ambiguous legislation and the demanding courts, 
EPA spent a great deal of time and resources generating complex 
quantitative risk assessments packed with details about the dose-
response curves for the pollutants, the distances and directions the 
pollutants traveled in the air, the characteristics of the populations 
living near regulated entities, and the likely exposure routes.202 
For the statutory changes proposed here, by contrast, steps can 
be taken to avoid both of those hindrances.  First, Congress should 
make clear in the legislative history accompanying the new provisions 
that it expects the BAT and MACT programs to be implemented ex-
peditiously and that, accordingly, the Agency is expected to use what-
ever risk data are readily available to it, even if they are incomplete 
or potentially subject to differing interpretations, rather than trying to 
quantify the exact harms to individuals living near a particular indus-
try by studying all the many different factors that affect risk levels.  
For instance, EPA might simply rely on information, as it has done 
already in the BAT and MACT programs, about just two factors: the 
 
REGULATION: HOW OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 14, 115-22 
(1988); Mark N. Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Restraints on Agency 
Discretion, 51 ADMIN L. REV. 429, 430-31 & n.3 (1999). 
 199. Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
 200. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5 th Cir. 1991). 
 201. Deossifying Rulemaking , supra  note 79, at 1402-03, 1410-11, 1419, 1422-23 (describing 
Benzene and Corrosion Proof Fittings decisions and hard look review). 
 202.  Dwyer, supra  note 110, at 279; Graham, supra note 75, at 117-19; Kuehn, supra note 
111, at 107-16. 
EPA’s efforts, at least under the Clean Air Act, were also delayed by a third impediment 
that did not relate strictly to any risk considerations.  The Agency struggled for years to give 
practical meaning to the vague statutory mandate that required it to protect the public health 
with an “ample margin of safety.”  It feared that if the provision were interpreted to mean that 
no risk whatsoever could be tolerated from hazardous air pollutants, then its standards would 
effectively have to shut down many industrial sources of those pollutants.  Dwyer, supra note 
110, at 278 (referring to the “potentially draconian measures on industry”).  Unwilling to ham-
per the nation’s economy to that degree, the Agency only issued a few rules that identified pol-
lutants to be regulated and a similarly small number of rules that set “ample ma rgin of safety” 
standards for those pollutants.  Id. at 279.  For the MACT program, however, Congress itself 
identified the 189 hazardous air pollutants to be regulated.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2000).  
And it allowed—indeed, expected—EPA to decline to impose beyond-the-floor standards if 
they would be economically disruptive.  See id. § 7412(d)(2) (EPA must “tak[e] into considera-
tion the cost of achieving” the MACT standard).  Hence, the Agency has little incentive to delay 
MACT rules just to avoid imposing excessive burdens on the regulated community. 
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quantity of pollutant that a technology could eliminate and the pol-
lutant’s relative toxicity, as indicated by previously -developed water 
quality criteria, by the information maintained in the federal govern-
ment’s Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, or by any 
other data.203  Or, if by chance, the Agency does not even have infor-
mation about a pollutant’s toxicity relative to other contaminants, it 
might rely on only one factor: the quantity of pollutant to be reduced, 
assuming it to be no less or more toxic than any other contaminant.  
Conversely, the Agency might use the results of full quantitative risk 
assessments if it could conduct them without undue delay, or, more 
likely, if they have been conducted already for other purposes.204  The 
 
 203. See supra  text accompanying notes 65-74, 123-38, and 143 (describing EPA’s practices 
under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act and the Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemi-
cal Substances).  The federal governmental also maintains other databases of health effects.  
“Cancer potency factors,” for example, are available through the Integrated Risk Information 
System, a database maintained by EPA.  See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants for Source Categories: Proposed Regulations Governing Compliance Extensions for 
Early Reductions of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 56 Fed. Reg. 27,338, 27,361 (proposed June 13, 
1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
For the notion that even incomplete risk information may be valuable in a regulatory con-
text, see Kuehn, supra  note 111, at 170 (Under certain circumstances, instead of conducting full 
scale quantitative risk assessments, “information on the toxic nature of the chemical and the 
likelihood of exposures would often be sufficient.”).  See also David Roe, Ready or Not: The 
Coming Wave of Toxic Chemicals, 29 ECOL. L.Q. 623 (2002) (arguing for the use of “shortcut” 
assessments of the toxicity of thousands of industrial chemicals and documenting California’s 
successful use of such limited toxicity inquiries in its regulations). 
Reluctance to let EPA use less-than-perfect scientific information about risks might stem 
from the “science charade”—the claim decisions about environmental regulations can be depo-
liticized if they are based simply on the “best” scientific information.  See, e.g., Wendy E. Wag-
ner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995) (de-
scribing the “camouflaging [of] controversial policy decisions as science”).  As Professor 
Wagner has so ably demonstrated, environmental decisions always involve political and social 
values that cannot be avoided, regardless of whether the “best” scientific data or some less so-
phisticated information is used.  Id. at 1618-27. 
 204. For instance, in one rulemaking EPA “reviewed a detailed exposure and risk assess-
ment performed for a source subject to State air toxics requirements.”  National Emission Stan-
dard for Hazardous Air Pollutants Phosphoric Acid Manufacturing and Phosphate Fertilizers 
Production, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,430, 68,436 (proposed Dec. 27, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
63).  In another, early MACT rulemaking, the Agency relied on a quantitative risk assessment it 
had conducted under the preceding “ample margin of safety” program.  See National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Chromium Emissions from Industrial Process Cool-
ing Towers, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,028, 43,032 (proposed Aug. 12, 1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
63) (explaining that in 1988, only five years before, EPA had done a risk assessment estimating 
the “annual incidence of cancer cases attributed to this source category,” which it then updated 
for this rule). 
EPA will likely have an opportunity to use the risk assessments for the Residual Risk pro-
gram to inform its MACT standards.  Under that program, EPA must promulgate emissions 
standards to provide an “ample margin of safety” to protect the public health from the emis-
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choice would be EPA’s, balancing the need for risk information with 
the need to conduct BAT and MACT rulemakings in a timely fash-
ion. 
Second, the courts should likewise allow EPA to use any avail-
able information by abandoning the “hard look” review that forced 
the Agency in the past to use only the most comprehensive and accu-
rate risk data.  Instead, jurists should recognize that assessing the 
risks posed by regulated sources is always an imprecise art, no matter 
how much data EPA gathers, so that, regardless of whether the 
Agency estimates the risks by conducting full quantitative risk as-
sessments or by far simpler measures, its methodologies should be 
given deference by the courts.205  Although the ongoing scholarly de-
bate about the ways to minimize “hard look” review206 is beyond the 
scope of this article, it is worth noting that, in the context of technol-
ogy-based standards, there is some reason to believe judges would be 
willing to accept EPA’s estimations of a technology’s risk reduction 
benefits based on only limited information.  Certainly courts defer to 
the Agency’s use of imperfect data about the costs and technical ca-
pabilities of the technologies under study—the other factors that are 
key to technology-based standards—because they recognize that the 
legislature expected those standards to be based on whatever infor-
 
sions remaining after industrial sources comply with the MACT standards.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
7412(f)(2)(A).  The statute calls for both those Residual Risk standards and another round of 
MACT standards to be adopted eight years after the first round of MACT standards, which 
means that the Agency will be writing both types of standards concurrently.  Id. §§ 7412(d)(6), 
(f)(2)(A).  The quantitative risk assessments that EPA will conduct for the Residual Risk pro-
gram could undoubtedly also influence the MACT rules.  Indeed, the se cond round of MACT 
standards may be unnecessary, especially because, as I have argued elsewhere, the “ample ma r-
gin of safety” standards of the Residual Risk program depend not only the health risks of the 
pollutants and sources at issue but also the control costs (McCubbin, supra note 110, at 4-6), just 
as the MACT standards consider not only the control costs but also the health risks.  The inter-
play between those two programs is fodder for a future article. 
 205. Indeed, while the judiciary may believe that quantitative risk assessments provide a 
more scientific or objective basis for EPA’s risk regulations, in reality those risk assessments are 
“anything but scientific, objective [or] credible” because they rely on “about fifty separate as-
sumptions or extrapolations” about which reasonable persons can disagree.  Shere, supra  note 
111, at 413.  See also McCubbin, supra note 110, at 22-23 (describing uncertainties of quantita-
tive risk assessments).  See generally Kuehn, supra note 111 (criticizing heavy reliance on quanti-
tative risk assessments). 
 206. See, e.g., Deossifying Rulemaking , supra  note 79, at 1453 (arguing for deferential review  
akin to a “pass/fail” test in school); Me ndeloff, supra  note 198, at 234 (arguing that Congress 
should overrule the Benzene decision expressly and require more traditional arbitrary and ca-
pricious review). 
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mation the Agency could gather relatively quickly.207  If Congress, as 
suggested above, makes clear that EPA need not have a fully accurate 
picture of the risks before adopting BAT or MACT standards, so that 
the programs can be implemented expeditiously, then there is no rea-
son why judges could not also uphold the Agency’s reliance on read-
ily available but limited risk information.208 
To be sure, even if these proposed statutory amendments will not 
paralyze the BAT and MACT programs, they will slow the process of 
setting technology-based standards somewhat because EPA will have 
to spend more time explaining and defending its assessments of the 
risk reduction benefits available from candidate technologies, which it 
previously did not reveal to the public (especially in the MACT pro-
gram) or defend in court (in both programs).  Those delays, however, 
are the price of transparency under the APA.  Unless the technology-
based provisions of the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act are 
amended to explicitly require the Agency to weigh the risk reduction 
benefits offered by pollution control technologies, EPA will continue 
in its BAT and MACT rulemakings to avoid the public and judicial 
scrutiny so vital to maintaining the Agency’s accountability. 
 
 207. See Consol. Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1979) (To adopt technology-
based standards under the Clean Water Act, “Congress has required the agency to act quickly 
and decisively despite a recognized absence of exact data on pollution control technology, and 
we must hesitate to draw substantive conclusions differing from those of the agency in this area 
of imprecise knowledge.”); Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (in challenge 
to MACT standards, court noting that “EPA typically has wide latitude in determining the ex-
tent of data-gathering necessary to solve a problem.  We generally defer to an agency’s decision 
to proceed on the basis of imperfect scientific information, rather than to ‘invest the resources 
to conduct the perfect study.’”); NRDC v. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1426-27 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (in 
challenge to BPT standards, court noting that EPA does not have to have “more than a rough 
idea of the costs the industry would incur,” not a “precise measurement of cost”); Reynolds 
Metals Co. v. EPA, 760 F.2d 549, 565 (4th Cir. 1985) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that the actual 
costs were 350 times higher than EPA’s estimates because the “agency has broad discretion in 
its selection of data and in the method of calculation, particularly when it involves highly scie n-
tific or technical considerations” ).  But see Rodgers, supra  note 13, at 36-37 (recounting courts 
that were “drawn into a host of micro-judgments” on various aspects of EPA’s technology-
based standards). 
 208. This “soft look” review, while substantively deferential, would still help maintain the 
Agency’s accountability by, inter alia, ensuring that EPA explained to the public all the factual 
and policy bases for the rulemakings, thereby facilitating political oversight of the Agency. 
